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In the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, the American
Law Institute (ALI) announced a general rule to resolve the problem of the
meaning of the word "defect," a problem that has haunted the law of torts
since section 402A of the ALI's 1965 Restatement (Second) ushered in the
era of strict liability for defective products. The new rule rejects consumer
expectations as a reliable measure of defect and proposes that the key
question is whether there existed a feasible alternative safer design, the
omission of which was unreasonable.' The Restatement (Third) thus heralds
the end of strict liability for product sellers, grounding products-liability
law's key concept-the defective product-in the law of negligence.
Courts had long grappled with the problem of defining " defect,"
drawing on concepts such as warranty and the consumer's reasonable
expectations. But they drew most successfully on risk-utility analysis, a
'I Adjunct Professor, Seton Hall University Law School. Thanks for helpful comments on an
earlier draft are due to Professors Margaret Gilhooley, Michael D. Green. Louise A. Halper, John
E. Keefe, J.A.D., D. Michael Risinger, and Charles A. Sullivan; and to colleagues at the bar Clare
M. Conk, William A. Dreier, PJ.A.D., Ret., and Ronald B. Grayzel. Melissa Fecak-Ortiz
provided expert research assistance. Finally, thanks are owed to the Hemophilia Association of
New Jersey for the opportunity to represent it in DJ.L v. Armour Pharmaceuticals Co.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIATY § 2 cmt. d (1998)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (" Assessment of a product design in most instances requires
a comparison between an alternative design and the product design that caused the injury,
undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable person. That approach is also used in administering
the traditional reasonableness standard in negligence."). The policy reasons that support use of a
reasonable-person perspective in connection with the general negligence standard also support its
application to products liability.
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negligence-based approach championed by John Wade,' the successor to
William Prosser as Reporter for the Restatement of Torts. The "alternative-
safer-design" rule enshrined in section 2 of the Restatement (Third) is the
vindication of Wade's view that design-defect litigation should turn on
whether the product could have and should have been made safer before it
was sold. Section 2 articulates a functional standard3 that does not depend
on the common-law categories that have persisted since the announcement
of the Restatement (Second)'s section 402A.4 In adopting the alternative-
safer-design standard, the ALl thus resolved the doctrinal wars of the past
thirty-five years over strict-liability, negligence, and warranty theories of
liability.
But a design defect lurks in the heart of the Restatement
(Third). In section 6(c), the ALI, virtually without debate, adopted
a rule that exempts sellers of prescription drugs5  and medical
2. Wade offered a list of factors he deemed significant in applying the "unreasonably
dangerous" standard:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not
be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the
price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973).
Many courts, including those in New Jersey and California, have derived their risk-utility
tests from Wade. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (adopting the
following five factors in its design-defect analysis: the gravity of the danger posed by the
challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a
safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to
the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design): Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (N.J. 1978) (citing Wade's factors in its design-
defect analysis). But see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263,
1267 n.9 (1991) (criticizing Wade as the intellectual precursor of the "liability without defect"
trend).
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. n (explaining that its rules are stated
functionally rather than in terms of traditional doctrinal categories such as warranty, negligence.
or strict liability).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)].
5. The Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1994), defines "drug" broadly
to include a biologic product used to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent any disease or to
affect the function or structure of the body. Blood and blood products are included in the category
of drugs under 21 C.F.R. § 607.3(b) (1998). Vaccines are drugs subject to FDA regulation under
42 U.S.C. § 262 (1994). Some vitamin products are categorized as drugs under 21 U.S.C.
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devices6 from the alternative-safer-design standard applied to all other
products.7 Under the ALI's new rule, designers and manufacturers of drugs
and medical devices will not be held liable even if their products reasonably
could have been made safer. The manufacturer need persuade the factfinder
only that, on balance, the product does more good than harm for at least one
class of users, so that a reasonable physician would prescribe it. The
alternative-safer-design standard is rejected not only for drugs, but also for
vaccines and mechanical devices such as cardiac pacemakers. Blood
products, although regulated as drugs by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), are excluded entirely from the Restatement, which acquiesces in the
wide legislative ban on strict or warranty liability for blood products. The
Restatement (Third) thus carves out a special, protective standard for a
uniquely favored industry.
The two-tiered system that section 6(c) inscribes in black letter
demands less than reasonable care from manufacturers of drugs and
medical devices. Its declaration that manufacturers of medical products
need not make a safer product if the existing product does more good than
harm reverses thirty-five years of safety-advancing products-liability law. If
adopted by the courts, the rule will create a dangerous chasm in the tort law
and ultimately will undermine the credibility of the ALI.
Citing the experience of hemophiliacs,' who became infected with
hepatitis and HIV through the use of contaminated blood products, this
Essay argues that drugs, vaccines, biological products, and medical devices
can and should be tested for defect by the same measures as all other
products. The unsafe-design problems that section 6(c) seeks to solve can
be addressed effectively by the mature and reliable functional rules of
section 2-the rules applicable to all other products. Applying the
alternative-safer-design standard to prescription drugs, vaccines, blood
products, and medical devices would accomplish a major objective of the
§ 321(g)(1). See United States v. Ten Cartons. More or Less, 72 F.3d 285. 287 (2d Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (nasally administered vitamin B-12 preparation); United States v. Dianovin Pharm. 475 F.
2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1973) (injectable vitamin K).
6. The term "device" is defined to include any " instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article. including any component.
part, or accessory... which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical
action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being
metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes." 21 U.S.C. § 321 (h). Some
devices may be sold only upon prescription. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.109.
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 6(c).
8. Hemophilia A, classic hemophilia, is an X-linked hereditary blood-clotting disorder caused
by defective or deficient factor VIII protein molecules. It appears worldwide in one in 10,000
male births. Hemophilia B is caused by a factor IX deficiency. See Harold R. Roberts & Maureane
Hoffman, Hemophilia and Related Conditions-Inherited Deficiencies of Prothrombin (Factor
II), Factor V, and Factors VII to XII, in WLUIAMS HEMATOLOGY 1413, 1413 (Ernest Beutler et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1995).
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ALI's Restatement process: culling a coherent rule from the cacophony of
common-law decisions.
Part I of this Essay describes the origins of the Restatement (Second)'s
section 402A as a draft rule protecting consumers from dangerous food
products, cosmetics, and other "intimate" products, and its adoption as an
expanded rule of strict liability for all kinds of defective products. It
reviews the case law that emerged from the Restatement (Second)'s
proclamation in comment k that selling an unavoidably dangerous but
useful product would not give rise to liability for injuries caused by the
product. This Part next explores the mass adoption of "blood shield laws"
immunizing manufacturers of blood products from liability for defects. The
Essay argues that the freedom from liability brought by the blood shield
laws retarded the research, development, and implementation of
pasteurizing techniques for blood derivatives. Part I also details the
crippling effect of the blood shield statutes on product-defect litigation
brought by hemophiliac plaintiffs infected with HIV and hepatitis from
blood products.
Part II describes and criticizes the ALI's adoption in the Restatement
(Third) of the "net benefit" test for drug and medical device liability. It
argues that the new Restatement's exclusion of drugs, medical devices,
vaccines, and blood products from the functional standard of the
alternative-safer-design test creates an undesirable fissure in the law. This
Part advocates, as an alternative, a negligence-based approach that holds all
manufacturers to a single standard of expertise.
Part III describes the experience of hemophiliacs in the United States in
the late 1970s and early 1980s in order to illustrate the dangers of
exempting medical-products manufacturers from ordinary rules of products
liability. Half of the nation's hemophiliacs were infected with the AIDS
virus or hepatitis before pharmaceutical companies began to market
pasteurized, virus-free concentrated blood products. Without the prod of
potential liability for failure to develop a safer product-a threat that was
removed by the blood shield laws in forty-seven states-manufacturers did
not innovate and bring safe products to market in a timely fashion. This Part
criticizes the ALI's exclusion of blood products from the Restatement
(Third)'s alternative-safer-design rule for failing to heed the lessons
presented by the hemophiliacs' catastrophic experience.
Part IV discusses the shortcomings of the Restatement (Third)'s
rationales for its special liability regime for medical products and suggests
that the Restatement be revised to apply a consistent, fault-based liability
rule for medical products and other products alike. This Part urges two
standards of design-defect liability: the alternative-safer-design test for
products capable of safer design, and a gross cost-benefit analysis for
products not reasonably amenable to safer design. This return to the
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traditional law of negligence constitutes a more coherent approach to
design-defect review and gives manufacturers of medical products the
incentives necessary to prevent a medical disaster like the hemophiliacs'
experience from recurring.
I. THE BROAD UMBRELLA OF SECTION 402A
A. The Old Regime: Comment k and Strict Liability to the Consumer
The history of the Restatement demonstrates the power of the black-
letter rule of law and the tendency of the Restatement's explanatory
comments to become authoritative texts that set the terms of debate for
many years. The Restatement (Second) announced in section 402A a rule
that came to be called "strict liability to the consumer for defective
products." Section 402A imposed liability even where the manufacturer
"exercised all possible care" to avoid harm due to products in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." 9 For thirty
years, section 402A and its comment k framed the debate about how
liability claims relating to prescription drugs and medical devices should be
adjudicated.
Section 402A ratified a body of product-defect case law emerging
from the state courts in the 1960s. The New Jersey Supreme Court
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors"0 and the California Supreme
Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products" inaugurated a new
era in the law of products liability. In the tradition of judicial
innovation represented by such jurists as Benjamin Cardozo '2 and Louis
9. The section reads as follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 4, § 402A.
10. 161 A.2d 69, 77 (NJ. 1960) (recognizing the general principle that a manufacturer's duty
runs directly to the consumer when the manufacturer markets its products directly to the
consumer).
11. 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) ("A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article
he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being.").
12. Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916),
inaugurated the modem era of consumer-protective products-liability law by imposing on an
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Brandeis, 3 the New Jersey and California Supreme Courts sought to use
tort law as a tool for consumer protection. The ALI's adoption of section
402A imparted credibility to this effort because of the prestige of the ALI
and the strong consensus among its leading voices that strict liability was
the proper rule. With the issuance of the Restatement (Second), the concept
of strict liability for defective products became institutionalized. 4
The first draft of section 402A called for strict liability but was limited
to "food for human consumption." "5 A later draft embraced all "products
intended for intimate bodily use."' 6 The final draft adopted in 1965
extended the rule to all products. 17 Section 402A contained an internal
tension: Its declaration that a manufacturer would be liable even if it
"exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of [its] product" was
bounded by its application only to products that were "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property." " Thus, the section's strict-liability rule was tempered by a
negligence-based concept of defect. 9 Limiting section 402A's strict-
liability rule further was comment k.2" Entitled "Unavoidably unsafe
automobile manufacturer a duty of inspection to discover product defects. Cardozo, an ALl
founder who played a leading role in the ALl even after he joined the United States Supreme
Court, was a strong supporter of the Restatements as a tool to improve the law. See ANDREW J.
KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 174 (1998).
13. One of Brandeis's innovations was the idea that privacy is a legally protectable ight. See
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see
also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (asserting that
individuals have the "right to be let alone").
14. The courts have hallowed the ALI's edict. James Henderson, Jr. and Aaron Twerski have
noted:
Only rarely do provisions of the American Law Institute's Restatements of the Law rise
to the dignity of holy writ. Even more rarely do individual comments to Restatement
sections come to symbolize important, decisive developments that dominate judicial
thinking. Nevertheless, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is such a
provision.
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1992).
15. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 918 (5th Cir. 1964) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961)).
16. Id. at 923 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Drift No. 7,
1962)).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Dean Prosser, who served as a Reporter for the Restatement (Second), noted the tension
between strict liability and negligence in section 402A: "Since proper design is a matter of
reasonable fitness, the strict liability adds little or nothing to negligence [on the part of the
manufacturer]; but it becomes more important in the case of a dealer who does not design the
product." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 659 n.72 (4th ed. 1971).
20. In its entirety, comment k reads:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads
to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself
1092 [Vol. 109: 1087
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products," comment k exempted manufacturers from liability for products
in which dangers necessarily inhered. Comment k quickly became the usual
starting point for judicial and scholarly analyses of liability for drugs,
cosmetics, food, cigarettes, and alcoholic beverages. 2' Prescription drugs,
for example, were considered "unavoidably unsafe" because they could
harm some users while helping others. This characteristic, combined with
the safeguards erected by the FDA approval processr the great social
utility of prescription drugs, the fact that drug use is supervised by
physicians, and the fear that the uncertainties of products-liability litigation
might have a chilling effect on drug innovation,' supported the view that
drugs should not be subject to the ordinary rules of products liability.
Because a safer alternative drug design typically was unavailable, drug-
defect litigation focused instead on the adequacy of instructions and
warnings to reduce the incidence and seriousness of harm. Comment k
came to be used as a defense in these cases. 24 Drug-design-defect litigation
was relatively rare. The infrequency with which plaintiffs brought such
defect claims reinforced the conventional wisdom that drugs were a special
product, not to be subjected to the usual rule of strict liability.
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve.
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning.
is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular
of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or
perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller
of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and
marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he
has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product.
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A cmt. k.
21. See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TFX. L REv.
398,408-10 (1970).
22. See generally Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1788-89, 1797-99 (1996) (discussing the protracted nature of the
FDA approval process).
23. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: 7he Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-12 (1993) (discussing the high success rate of plaintiffs
in Bendectin cases despite the paucity of evidence linking the drug to birth defects).
24. See, e.g., Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Because
comment k itself refers to prescription drugs and vaccines as examples of products that are
'unavoidably unsafe' and hence not 'unreasonably dangerous' as long as they are properly
manufactured and a proper warning is given, defendant suggests we need inquire no further before
we brand the design defect evidence and instruction here as error. We prefer. however, to proceed
with more caution before we confer such special protection on a product."); see also Marc 7
Edell, Risk Utility Analysis of Unavoidably Unsafe Products. 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 623, 644-
46 (1987) (discussing the adequacy of warnings as insulation against strict liability).
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Blood products, too, were branded as "unavoidably unsafe." This
determination was codified by forty-seven states in "blood shield laws"
that protected sellers of blood and blood products from strict-liability and
warranty claims. Negligence claims for blood products usually were
permitted, but were practically impossible for plaintiffs to win. 5 With the
passage of time, it has been recognized that the "unavoidably unsafe"
designation for blood was inaccurate-in fact, there was a practical and
feasible alternative safer design for some blood products. As is described
more fully in Part II, the proprietary manufacturers of anti-hemophilic
factor concentrate ultimately developed pasteurization techniques that
eliminated the risk of contracting HIV or hepatitis from concentrated blood
products. Today, anti-hemophilic factor concentrate can be made from
recombinant DNA, which, because it is artificial, transmits no blood-borne
viruses or other sources of infection.26
To summarize, the Restatement (Second)'s section 402A embodied a
strict-liability rule, tempered with negligence elements, that ostensibly
applied to all products. However, prescription drugs fell within the ambit of
comment k, which rejected liability for "unavoidably unsafe" but useful
products. Blood products were afforded virtual immunity from suit due to
the widespread enactment of blood shield statutes by the states. The
following Section discusses the way in which these rules from the era of the
Restatement (Second) played out in the courts.
B. Two Lines of Cases Emerge in the Era of Comment k
Two lines of drug-design-defect cases emerged in the wake of the
Restatement (Second).7 The main line treated drugs like other products,
calling for examination of defect claims on a case-by-case basis. That line,
despite wider acceptance by the courts, was rejected by the ALI in the
Restatement (Third). The second line, praised by the Restatement (Third)
Reporters and cited in support of that Restatement's new liability rule,
opposed the imposition of strict liability for drugs (and, occasionally, for
medical devices). This line of cases viewed comment k as a valid defense
for drug manufacturers. Prescription drugs were considered "unavoidably
unsafe" and were not subjected to alternative-safer-design analysis. Drugs
were held to be socially desirable-and thus deserving of protection from
design-defect suits-despite their dangers.
25. See INSTITUTE OF MED., HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY: AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS
DECISIONMAKING 223 (1995) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
26. See Jay E. Menitove et al., Preparation and Clinical Use of Plasma and Plasma
Fractions, in WILLIAMS HEMATOLOGY, supra note 8, at 1649, 1650.
27. See Joanne Rhoton Galbreath, Annotation, Products Liability: What Is an "Unavoidably
Unsafe" Product?, 70 A.L.R.4th 16 (1989) (collecting cases).
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1. The Feldman-Kearl-Toner Line
In the Feldman'=-Kear129-Toner3" line of cases, if there was a feasible
alternative design choice, the product was subjected to the jurisdiction's
usual doctrinal analysis for product-defect claims. In the first of the three
cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that it saw no reason to
hold as a matter of law that all prescription drugs that are unsafe are
unavoidably so:
Drugs, like any other products, may contain defects that could have
been avoided by better manufacturing or design. Whether a drug is
unavoidably unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis; we
perceive no justification for giving all prescription drug
manufacturers a blanket immunity from strict liability
manufacturing and design defect claims under comment k.3'
A year later in Kearl, a polio vaccine case, a California intermediate
court followed Feldman and criticized the routine and mechanical fashion
in which many appellate courts had concluded that certain products,
particularly drugs, were entitled to such special treatment. The court
observed that the "statement that drugs are unavoidably [dangerous], and
therefore within the protection of comment k, has become almost
tautological." 3 2 The court emphasized that "whether a drug, vaccine, or any
other product... triggers unavoidably dangerous product exemption from
strict liability design-defect analysis poses a mixed question of law and fact
and can be made only after evidence is first taken, out of the jury's
presence, on the relevant factors to be considered."33
In Toner, a DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) vaccine case, the
Idaho Supreme Court embraced Kearl and Feldman, explaining:
As an additional element of an "unavoidable risk," there must be,
at the time of the subject product's distribution, no feasible
alternative design which on balance accomplishes the subject
product's purpose with a lesser risk. If there were, then the risk
would not be "unavoidable" or "apparently reasonable." Nor
would the "marketing and use of the [product] be fully justified" if
there were such an alternative design ....
28. Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (NJ. 1984).
29. 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64.
30. Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 306-08 (Idaho 1987).
31. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 383.
32. Kearl, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 463-64 (citation omitted).
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... We do not believe comment k was intended to provide nor
should it provide all ethical drugs with blanket immunity from strict
liability design defect claims.'
The Feldman-Kearl-Toner approach has resolved single-drug,"
combination-drug, 6 vaccine,37 and medical-device 38 cases in two ways. If a
redesign was considered available-in other words, if the drug ingredients
could be changed or the device mechanically redesigned without affecting
efficacy-then the court treated the medical product like any other product.
It allowed the case to proceed to trial under the jurisdiction's prevailing
approach to products-liability risk-utility analysis. If, however, no redesign
appeared feasible, and the product was therefore "unavoidably unsafe," the
seller was relieved of liability so long as the warnings accompanying the
product were adequate and the product was judged to do more good than
harm. This analysis involved weighing the product's overall utility against
its dangers for foreseeable users. Dangerous but socially desirable products
were held to be exempt from strict liability. The classic illustration was
comment k's reference to the highly injurious Pasteur rabies vaccine,"
which presented the potentially infected person with a choice between the
dangers of the vaccine and the risk of a dreadful illness and swift death.
34. Toner, 732 P.2d at 306-08 (citations omitted).
35. See Davila v. Bodelson, 704 P.2d 1119, 1127-28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that for
the drug Pitocin, since no alternative safer design was available, the only relevant issue was the
drug's utility to users); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sop, 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988)
(holding that for DES, courts should follow a case-by-case approach in deciding whether to
extend comment k protection).
36. Oral contraceptives are one example of a combination drug. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying the alternative-safer-design test to an oral
contraceptive); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608 (Ark. 1991) (same); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.
Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (finding sufficient evidence to conclude that the oral
contraceptive at issue was beneficial for at least one class of users and holding that the alternative-
safer-design question should be submitted to the jury).
37. See Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., 719 F. Supp. 470, 476-77 (N.D. W. Va. 1989), aff'd, 916
F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that in order to raise a comment k defense, the manufacturer
must show that its DTP vaccine was "unavoidably unsafe"); White v. Wyeth Lab., 533 N.E.2d
748, 752 (Ohio 1988) (observing, in a case concerning the DTP vaccine, that comment k
"[o]bviously... does not apply to all drugs" and noting that "[i]t is equally obvious that not all
drugs are so perfectly designed that they cannot be made more pure or more safe, or that there are
not safer, suitable alternatives; nor do the benefits of all drugs necessarily outweigh their risks").
38. The medical devices reviewed in these cases include intrauterine devices, implants, and
surgical contrast fluids. See Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1337-39 (9th Cir. 1985)
(upholding a jury's conclusion that the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device was defective under the
alternative-safer-design test); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1301 (D. Minn.
1988) (Cu-7 intrauterine device); Savina v. Sterling Drug, 795 P.2d 915, 925-27 (Kan. 1990)
(concluding that the myelogram dye metrizamide is unavoidably unsafe): Tansy v. Dacomed
Corp., 890 P.2d 881, 887 (Okla. 1994) (penile implant).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A cmt. k (noting that the rabies vaccine
"not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected," but
nonetheless was not unreasonably dangerous given the grave consequences of the disease it
prevented).
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2. The Brown Line: Exemption from Strict Liability
A second line of cases emerged in the comment k era following Brown
v. Superior Court.40 In these cases, the courts held that the product
categories of prescription drugs and medical devices were "unavoidably
unsafe," or were so useful that the manufacturers of these products should
not be subject to strict liability even if the drug or device could have been
designed more safely. In Brown, the California Supreme Court adjudicated
the consolidated claims of sixty-nine children who suffered in utero damage
due to their mothers' ingestion of the carcinogenic anti-miscarriage drug
DES. The court rejected the Kearl approach of treating the question of
whether a drug's dangers are "unavoidable" as a question of fact and found
in favor of the manufacturer.4 '
The Brown court, eschewing strict liability, rejected for design defects
in drugs42 even the negligence-based, risk-utility framework it had adopted
ten years earlier in Barker v. Lull Engineering.43 Brown did leave the door
open for some form of negligence liability, but resoundingly rejected strict
liability on policy grounds:
If drug manufacturers were subject to strict liability, they might be
reluctant to undertake research programs to develop some
pharmaceuticals that would prove beneficial or to distribute others
that are available to be marketed, because of the fear of large
adverse monetary judgments. Further, the additional expense of
insuring against such liability-assuming insurance would be
available-and of research programs to reveal possible dangers not
detectable by available scientific methods could place the cost of
medication beyond the reach of those who need it most."
In the three decades following section 402A's publication, comment k
was widely recognized as setting a negligence, rather than a strict-
liability, standard. Because drugs were so often deemed unavoidably
unsafe, liability analyses usually focused either on warnings or
on the product's overall utility, rather than any specific aspect of
product design. As risk-utility tests such as those espoused by Wade and
40. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
41. Seeid at481-83.
42. A California appellate court extended the reasoning of Brown to silicone breast implants.
which are considered a medical device. See Artiglio v. Superior Court. 22 Cal. App. 4th 1388.
1397 (Ct. App. 1994) ("We... conclude that the entire category of medical implants available
only by resort to the services of a physician are immune from design defect strict liability.-).
43. 573 P.2d 443, 452-57 (Cal. 1978) (establishing dual approaches to defining product
defects: the consumer-expectations test and negligence-based risk-utility analysis).
44. Brown, 751 P.2d at 479.
45. See Wade, supra note 2, at 837-38.
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Keeton4 came to dominate design-defect analysis, strict liability to the
consumer increasingly was confined by the courts to manufacturing defects
and to merchants' vicarious liability. The strict-liability label persisted,
however,47 creating confusion in judicial opinions. The California Supreme
Court's opinion in Brown, for example, labeled risk-utility analysis a form
of strict liability, rather than a negligence-based standard.48
3. The Blood Test: Exclusion from Products-Liability Law by
Legislation
The law surrounding blood and blood products developed somewhat
differently from that governing defect claims for prescription drugs,
vaccines, and medical devices. Not long after the promulgation of section
402A, an epidemic of transfusion-associated hepatitis dramatically affected
the course of product-defect law for blood products. The idea of strict
products liability began to seize the imaginations of judges, lawyers, and
academic commentators as a possible means of combating the epidemic, or
at least of compensating its victims. Professor Marc Franklin, for example,
expressed some skepticism that strict liability could succeed in providing
compensation or deterring defective designs, but nonetheless argued that
the "safety incentive justification" was a "compelling basis for strict
liability."' 49 He reasoned that the blood banks and hospitals were "in the
best position to analyze safety techniques and their costs"; therefore, tort
law should place the burden on them to manufacture and use blood products
safely.50 Franklin noted, however, that the law was "caught between
conventional strict-liability analysis for defective products, reflected in
recent court opinions, and the opposing claim that liability in the healing
professions should be based on fault alone, which is the position taken by
many legislatures." 51
46. See Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-
38 (1973) (stating that the determination that a product is unreasonably dangerous turns on the
question of whether, on balance, the danger presented by the product outweighs its utility, so that
a reasonable man would not sell the product if he knew the risk involved).
47. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984) (determining that " [t]he
question in strict liability design-defect and warning cases is whether, assuming that the
manufacturer knew of the defect in the product, he acted in a reasonably prudent manner in
marketing the product or in providing the warnings given" and observing that "[t]hus, once the
defendant's knowledge of the defect is imputed, strict liability analysis becomes almost identical
to negligence analysis in its focus on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct."); see also
David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REV. 743 (arguing that "strict liability" is often a negligence standard in practice).
48. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 474.
49. Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 439, 479 (1972).
50. Id
51. Id.
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But strict liability never was applied to blood products. Negligence-
based claims remained available as a hypothetical remedy for and possible
deterrent to the manufacture and use of unsafe blood products. Due to
lobbying by hospitals, physicians, and blood banks, however, state
legislatures spurned the strict products-liability remedy. Instead, they
enacted blood shield statutes en masse in response to section 402A. In
1965, three states had blood shield laws; by 1972, the count was forty-
one.5 2 These statutes made it clear that the "healing professions," including
hospitals and both nonprofit and proprietary 3 manufacturers of blood
products, were to be judged more deferentially than other producers and
sellers. They would be untouched by modem products-liability law, even
though William Prosser, ALI Reporter and godfather of the strict-liability
movement, had viewed blood products as proper subjects of fault-based
design-defect review:
There are a number of cases involving hepatitis resulting from
blood transfusions... [which have] been regarded by most courts
as a service, and not a sale.... But a blood bank which supplies the
blood is certainly to be regarded as a seller; and the general refusal
to hold it strictly liable has gone on the basis of the unavoidability
of the danger. [However, when] any evidence can be produced that
it might have been avoided, it becomes a question for the jury, and
may lead to liability.-5
The rationale for the legislative departure from this viewpoint was that
the work of blood banks and health care providers was of such great social
importance that it should be allowed to proceed unhampered by the threat
of litigation. Arkansas's 1971 blood shield statute exemplifies this
understanding, finding as legislative fact that the "imposition of legal
liability without fault upon the persons and organizations engaged in such
scientific procedures inhibits the exercise of sound medical judgment and
restricts the availability of important scientific knowledge, skills, and
52- See id. at 474-75. Ultimately, 47 states passed blood shield laws. See IOM REPORT. supra
note 25, at 48. The jurisdictions that left the issue to the common law were New Jersey. the
District of Columbia, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See id.
53. The dominant nonprofit force in the blood industry was the American Red Cross, which
in the first half of the 1970s accounted for about half of the blood used in America. over five
million units a year. See DOUGLAS STARR, BLOOD: AN EPIC HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND
CoMMERCE 252 (1998). Community blood banks, united in the rival American Association of
Blood Banks, collected over 35% of the nation's blood supply. See iL Proprietary companies
expanded during the 1970s and by the end of the decade had bought out almost a third of the
nearly 400 blood collection centers in the United States. See id at 258. Four major companies
controlled most of the world's plasma, which was "becoming an integrated resource, mixed and
distributed all over the world." Id at 258-59.
54. PROssER, supra note 19, at 661-62 (emphasis added).
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materials."" Therefore, declared the legislature, it was "the public policy
of this state to promote the health and welfare of the people by limiting the
legal liability arising out of such scientific procedures to instances of
negligence or willful misconduct." 56
Two tiers of products-liability law thus emerged in the era of
comment k, with legislative sanction. There was a general trend in the
common law to ground defect claims in what Prosser had recognized as the
negligence heart of products-liability law. But blood products, even those
produced by for-profit commercial entities, were excluded from this
regime. Most state legislatures codified the unique treatment of blood, but
even in the common-law states, "the likelihood that a court would hold a
hospital or blood donor service liable under either breach of implied
warranty or strict-liability theories was considered remote." 57
These legislative determinations held fast, even as the impact on the
public health of immunizing the blood banks from liability became clear.
The hepatitis A and B epidemics persisted in the 1970s, and "non-A, non-
B" hepatitis emerged. The incidence of hepatitis among hemophiliacs grew
as proprietary pharmaceutical companies increased their production
capacity. The companies established commercial blood collection centers in
Africa, Latin America, and many American prisons in order to meet the
demand for pooled anti-hemophilic factor (AHF) plasma products, which
they sold both domestically and globally. This collection of blood from
prisoners and others at high risk for hepatitis greatly increased the incidence
of the disease in the blood supply, and thus the dangers to hemophiliacs,
who depended on the unpasteurized, pooled blood products.58
Despite the growing risks, no lobbyists for the jaundiced walked the
legislative halls. Potential plaintiffs' lawyers saw no prospect of success in
the face of blood shield laws that foreclosed strict-liability and implied
warranty causes of action, which were the principal doctrinal tools of
products-liability litigation. Shielded from suit, the blood industry had no
incentive to pursue research and development of pasteurization techniques
to reduce the risk of contracting hepatitis (and later HIV) from the blood
supply. The blood shield laws thus allowed the blood industry to continue
to make blood products that were avoidably unsafe, at tremendous cost to
human life. Not until well after the third wave of viral infection-HIV-
devastated hemophiliacs in the early 1980s did design-defect suits begin to
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-801(b) (Michie 1987).
56. Id. § 801(c). The legislature extended this protection to all individuals and entities
providing any "tissue, organ, blood, or component thereof." Id. § 802. California followed a
somewhat different approach, excluding blood from the law of warranty. It removed the subject
from the law of sales and placed it within the ambit of professional negligence, which is governed
by the customary standard of care. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1990).
57. IOM REPORT, supra note 25, at 48.
58. See STARR, supra note 53, at 231-49.
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emerge. Hobbled by the blood shield laws, this litigation did little to
compensate the hemophiliac victims of the epidemics. Although in the
1990s two state legislatures passed laws affording a tort remedy to
hemophiliacs infected with HIV,"9 this legislative response was too little,
too late.
II. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) SECTION 6(c): THE PROPOSED NEW REGIME
A. The Net Benefit Test
Design-defect litigation centers on the search for a safer mousetrap-
safer for the trapper, that is. Under the general rule of Restatement (Third)
section 2, designs that unreasonably fail to use available techniques to
increase safety are held to be defective.' If there is no practical safer-design
choice, the seller has two options: decline to market the product or render it
reasonably safe by means of warnings and instructions for use. In design-
defect litigation, this standard is implemented by asking the factfinder to
decide whether the manufacturer's failure to adopt a design feature
proposed by the plaintiff was, on balance, right or wrong.6' In section 6(c)
59. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-26.1 (West Supp. 1999); N.Y. C.P.LR. § 214-c (Consol.
Supp. 1999). The New Jersey legislature explained that it was acting to assure that HIV-infected
hemophiliacs would get "their day in court." A New Jersey court, upholding the statute, found
that holding proprietary blood products manufacturers accountable was "consistent with one of
the overriding purposes of product liability law--to spread the burden of damages which flow
from such injuries onto those responsible for the products' design and manufacture." DJ.L v.
Armour Pharm. Co., 704 A.2d 104, 117 (NJ. Super. Ct Law Div. 1997) (footnote omitted).
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2. The general rule is that
[a] product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings. A product:
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain
of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor,
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
61. David G. Owen has observed that while courts generally define the balance in terms of a
weighing of the product's global costs and benefits, what juries actually decide is typically "the
much more narrow 'micro-balance' of the costs and benefits of the particular design feature that
the plaintiff claims the manufacturer ought to have adopted." David G. Owen, Risk-Utiiy
Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239,239 (1997) [hereinafter Owen.
Risk-Utility Balancing]; see also David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design
Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1661, 1687 (1997). The
Restatement (Third) embraced the "micro-balancing" approach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 1, § 2 cmt. f Reporter's note.
2000] 1101
The Yale Law Journal
of the Restatement (Third), the ALI prescribed a different liability standard
for prescription drugs, vaccines, and medical devices. Known as the "net
benefit test," this standard states:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug
or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing
of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients. 6
Thus, if the medical product does more harm than good for at least one
class of users, it will not be considered defective. This is true even if the
product unnecessarily causes harm, in the sense that there is a feasible safer
alternative design. Section 6(c) mirrors the "manifestly unreasonable"
design standard recognized (somewhat grudgingly) in section 2, which
states that some product designs have such low social utility and are so
dangerous that liability should attach even absent proof of a reasonable
alternative design.63 Section 6(c) is also notable in that it represents a
"product category" approach to liability rules even though the ALI
elsewhere rejected the categorical approach.' 4
The net benefit rule is a standard under which liability rarely will be
imposed. Indeed, a design-defect claim will not survive even the summary
judgment stage unless the court determines that a reasonable person could
conclude that the product was defective under this narrow standard.65 While
it is true that for most prescription drugs there is no alternative safer design,
this is not always the case. Moreover, that fact does not logically compel a
categorical doctrinal exception for all such drugs, vaccines, and medical
devices-a group of products that has in common only the fact that they are
prescribed or administered by a licensed health care provider. By any
62. Id. § 6(c). For an example of a judicial interpretation of the net benefit test, see Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), a suit by a child who contracted polio from
the Sabin oral live polio vaccine in which the court held that an unavoidably unsafe product is
unreasonably dangerous only if it is "so dangerous that a reasonable man would not sell the
product if he knew the risk involved." Id. at 1273-74.
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. e. The section 6(c) standard also bears
some resemblance to a negligence-based marketing liability standard proposed by Joseph Page for
generic product-defect cases. See Joseph A. Page, Liability for Unreasonably and Unavoidably
Unsafe Products: Does Negligence Doctrine Have a Role To Play?, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 87,
127-28 (1996) (arguing that a product's dangers may be so great as to make its sale unreasonable
even in the absence of a feasible safer alternative design).
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d (clarifying that the reasonable
alternative-safer-design standard "applies in most instances even though the plaintiff alleges that
the category of product sold by the defendant is so dangerous that it should not have been
marketed at all").
65. See id. § 6 cmt. f.
[Vol. 109: 10871102
Design Defect in the Restatement (Third)
measure, section 6(c) is an aberration, and an unjustifiable one. How, then,
did it come into being?
B. The Proceedings of the ALl: Deliberation and Omission
The American Law Institute debated the new products-liability
Restatement at five annual sessions from May 1994 through April 1998.
Vigorous debate characterized the consideration of the main liability
proposals in section 2, particularly the abandonment of the traditional
consumer-expectations test for product defect and the adoption of the
reasonable alternative design standard.' The debate over these provisions
carried over from the floor to the academic literature.' ALI Reporters
James Henderson and Aaron Twerski widely disseminated and defended
their views as the project advanced.6s As a result, they were successful in
preserving the main lines of their initial proposals through successive drafts
of the new Restatement.
The Reporters had been harsh critics of the strict-liability movement'
and section 402A's comment k. The comment's 275 words on drug
products liability had been exhaustively parsed, praised, and appropriated
by opposing combatants for thirty years, and the Reporters were eager for a
fresh start on the question of drug products liability. They renounced even
the possibility of simply restating the law of drug products liability: "Case
law that is unintelligible cannot be intelligibly restated. There is a need in
66. See 74 A-L.I. PRoc. 892-902 (1997); 73 A.L.I. PROC. 136-64 (1996); 72 A.I. PROC.
104-40 (1995); 71 A.L.I. PROC. 272-87 (1994).
67. See William A. Dreier, Design Defects Under the Proposed Section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability: A Judge's View, 30 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 221
(1997); Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALl Product Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachronism?, 61
TENN. L. REV. 1105 (1994); Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in
Design Defect Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REV. 609, 622-23 (1995); Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't
Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning
Law Is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1125 (1994); Owen, supra note 47. at 743; David G. Owen. The
Graying of Products Liability Law, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1241 (1994); Page, supra note 63, at 87;
Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265 (1994); Marshall S. Shapo, A New
Legislation: Remarks on the Draft Restatement of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.L REFORM
215 (1997); John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a
"New Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects, 26 U. ME.i. L REV. 493
(1996); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and
Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L REV. 1429 (1994).
68. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867 (1998); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski.
Arriving at Reasonable Alternative Design: The Reporters' Travelogue, 30 U. MICH. J.L
REFORM 563 (1997); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products
Liability Restatement, 26 HoFsRA L. REv. 667 (1998); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L REV.
1257 (1993); Aaron Twerski, From a Reporter's Perspective: A Proposed Agenda, 10 TOURO L
REV. 5 (1993).
69. See Henderson & Twersld, supra note 2, at 1286-92.
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this area to clarify the issues and to provide direction to the courts as to how
this very special genre of cases can be sensibly approached." 
70
Although their original proposals concerning what ultimately became
section 6(c) spoke only of prescription drugs,7' the Reporters' Tentative
Draft Number 1 extended this highly manufacturer-protective standard to
prescription medical devices.72 Surprisingly, this change sparked no debate
on the floor of the Institute's annual meetings. Through several drafts, no
amendment was offered and no one challenged the exemption of both
prescription drugs and medical devices from the alternative-safer-design
standard embodied in section 2. The ALI also quietly acquiesced in the
exclusion of blood products from the liability rule of section 2, declaring in
section 19(c) of the Restatement (Third) that "[h]uman blood and human
tissue, even when provided commercially, are not subject to the rules of this
Restatement." 
74
Academic commentators criticized the ALI's proposed rule
for drugs as setting a "super-negligence" standard of liability75
and argued in favor of either negligence-based 76  or strict-liability-
70. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 14, at 1545; see also id. at 1537 ("The problem can in
large part be attributed to the existing comment k, which is poorly drafted and internally
inconsistent.... To draw on comment k as authority to resolve problems that no one even
contemplated at the time of its adoption is sheer foolishness.").
71. See id. at 1522-23 (presenting proposed revisions of comment k).
72. Tentative Draft Number I proposed that plaintiffs should be required to prove that "[tlhc
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device were sufficiently great in relation
to its therapeutic benefits as to deter a reasonable medical provider, possessing knowledge of such
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, from prescribing the drug or medical device for any
class of patients." Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement
(Third), 61 TENN. L. REv. 1357, 1365 n.40 (1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b)(4), at 89 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)) (emphasis added).
73. The only negative word spoken on the floor concerning the proposed standard was
Professor Howard Latin's comment at the 1995 meeting that section 8(c) (later section 6(c)) was
"very, very friendly to drug manufacturers." 72 A.L.I. PROc. 281 (1995). There was some floor
debate concerning Latin's suggestion that section 6(c)'s language be changed from "no
reasonable health care provider" to "reasonable health care providers." See id. at 276. This
amendment was accepted by the Reporters as a way of emphasizing the objective rather than the
subjective nature of the standard. There was also debate over another motion by Latin concerning
potential liability in situations in which the manufacturer knows that its drug or device is "being
prescribed to a class of patients for whom the ratio of foreseeable risks to therapeutic benefits
exceeds the risk-to-benefit ratio afforded by a reasonable alternative design or reasonable
alternative product." Id. at 869-70. This motion was defeated.
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 19(c).
75. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 72, at 1364 (" [Tihe proposal [would] establish[] a 'super'
negligence standard of liability .... [T]he proposed standard ... will create such a narrow band of
liability that it would effectively eliminate a cause of action for defective design.").
76. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs:
The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76,
110 (1994) (advocating a "pure negligence" standard as "an appropriate middle step" between
strict liability and the Restatement's near-immunity); Angela C. Rushton, Comment, Design
Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and the Goals
of a Functional Approach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389, 420, 435 (1996) (criticizing the Restatement
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based" standards of drug-design-defect review. Henderson rejected these
criticisms, urging "substantial deference to a marketplace for prescription
drugs that appears to function almost perfectly."7 Additional academic
criticism was leveled by Michael Green, an ALI Adviser, who supported
section 6(c) for drugs but questioned its suitability for medical devices and
vaccines, which he believed were more readily subject to design
improvements.79
But the Reporters never had to respond' to these criticisms on the
Institute floor. The silence from the floor is mystifying. The Reporters'
assertions were vulnerable to criticism not only because of the proposed
new rule's manufacturer-friendliness, but also because the common-law
basis for the rule was thinly documented.' Indeed, the Reporters had
(Third) approach as insufficiently protective of consumers but conceding that "a drug should
receive the protection of a heightened liability standard ... when its benefits outweigh its risks").
77. See Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foutdation Is Prepared: The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 261, 270-71, 279 (1997) (advocating strict liability for drug-design defects and
criticizing section 6(c) for "clearly favoring manufacturers by eliminating strict liability, skirting
negligence, and adopting a radical new theory with little attempt to balance the interests of the
consumers").
78. James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the Proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter's Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 471.481 (1996).
79. See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability. Eramining the Strongest
Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRm 461 (1997) [hereinafter Green. Statutory Compliance]. Green
commented:
The analysis for design defects in drugs is quite different and driven by the unique
character of most drugs. Unlike durable goods, drugs cannot be designed in an
alternative fashion, at least not in light of current technological capabilities. With the
Restatement (Third)'s adoption of a risk-benefit test for design defects and its insistence
on proof of an alternative design, one might think that there would therefore be no
place for a design defect theory involving pharmaceuticals.
But the Restatement (Third) does have a very limited provision for a design defect
claim in the case of pharmaceuticals ....
Id. at 471 (footnotes omitted). Green clarified in a footnote that - It]his observation is inapplicable
to medical devices. Pharmaceuticals differ from most products because it is difficult to change the
design of a given drug; medical devices, such as the Dalkon Shield with a multifilament tailstring,
although subject to FDA regulation, do not share that characteristic with drugs." la at 471 n.36;
see also Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement (Third):
Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207. 208 n.4 (1999) (suggesting that while
section 6(c) may be an appropriate regime for prescription drugs, medical devices and vaccines
may be sufficiently different from drugs as to require a different liability rle); Green. supra note
67, at 619-20 (suggesting that vaccines are appropriate subjects of alternative-safer-design
analysis).
80. Compare the Restatement (Third) Reporters' notes' thorough state-by-state review of
cases in support of section 2's alternative design standard with the Reporters' sparse defense of
the section 6(c) rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1. §§ 2. 6 Reporters' notes. In their
section 6(c) note, the Reporters assert that courts "traditionally have refused to review the
reasonableness of the designs of prescription drugs and medical devices." I § 6 cnt. f Reporter's
note. Fifteen jurisdictions are cited that do not follow the traditional "no review" rule and only six
states are identified that "have adopted essentially the approach taken in § 6(c)." d Moreover,
one of those six state cases, Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881 (Okla. 1994), in fact notes the
appropriateness of the alternative-safer-design test for review of medical devices. See id. at 886.
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announced that they were not even attempting to restate the law. On the
contrary, as the review of the case law presented in Part II of this Essay
demonstrates, the courts have adjudicated drug and medical device cases
using the analytical tools underlying section 2. Their decisions did not point
in the direction of the rule embodied in section 6(c).8" Thus, the ALl
adopted section 6(c) without benefit either of floor debate or of a solid
bedrock of judicial decisions. In contrast, the alternative-safer-design test of
section 2 is well grounded in the common law.
The alternative-safer-design test has great potential to rescue products-
liability law from critics who see it as unpredictable or as a blunt, punitive
instrument.8 2 It provides a means of resolving the two lines of design-defect
cases from the era of comment k, the Feldman-Kearl-Toner line and the
Brown line. Furthermore, the alternative-safer-design test relies on a
method of analysis that courts are particularly competent to perform:
comparison of the facts of the actual case with a hypothetical set of facts."
This type of analogical dialogue is the dominant form of lawyers' reasoning
and is found throughout the common law. Because the ALI's section 6(c)
rule abandons the comparative method of product-defect analysis, courts
that adopt it will deprive themselves of one of the common law's most
powerful analytical tools. The ALI's failure to apply the alternative design
test of section 2 to prescription drugs and medical devices evinces a lack of
appreciation of the strength of the comparative approach.
A further advantage of the alternative-safer-design test is its
accessibility to lay juries. The test focuses the jury on the designer's choice
regarding concrete particulars rather than on abstract questions that have
befuddled judges and juries, such as whether the product's benefits
outweigh its dangers or whether certain categories of products should be
81. The Reporters' departure from the dominant common-law rules was evident. In their first
alternative revision of comment k, the Reporters stated that courts had traditionally limited drug-
defect claims to failure-to-warn theories, see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 14, at 1512, an
approach the Reporters had long disparaged, see, e.g., James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski,
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure To Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
265 (1990). That statement may be an accurate summary of how the bulk of drug products-
liability cases have been litigated in the past, but it does not accurately capture the current
majority rule.
82. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, 414-15 (1992) ("Together the rule of
strict liability in conjunction with the design defect tests have wreaked havoc within the
manufacturing sector of the economy.... [T]he modem solution has failed to provide what we
seek, a principled, rational, and predictable body of law regulating product safety."), RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 103 (1995) (" Breakthroughs in technology and
treatment need carrots, not sticks.").
83. See Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv.
435, 468 (1979) (noting that "one simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-benefit defect in a
product design until and unless one has identified some design alternative" to serve as a referent);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 790-91 (1993)
(expounding the virtues of analogical reasoning in judicial decisionmaking).
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marketed at all.' It enables persons of different values and experience to
bridge the gaps among them and reach principled agreement.
The ALI's failure to adopt the comparative approach is regrettable.
Adhering to a gross cost-benefit method of products-defect analysis that it
has elsewhere found wanting,"6 the ALI in section 6(c) has replaced the
doctrinal wars over strict and negligence standards of liability with a
conflict derived from the adoption of different liability rules for different
industries. The ALI exempted a favored industry from the comparative
design-choice analysis imposed on all other producers, and if the courts
follow this rule, they too will find themselves playing favorites. Courts
rejecting the alternative-safer-design test for medical industries also will
abandon an analytical tool that could prove increasingly useful as genetic
engineering and microbiology advance and the range of design choices for
pharmaceutical product designers becomes broader and less opaque.! The
Restatement (Third) and its Reporters' notes ignore this prospectY The
consequences of maintaining a separate, highly protective liability regime
for manufacturers of blood products are described in the following Part.
IT[. MANUFACTURED CATASTROPHE:
THE HIV AND HEPATITIS EPIDEMICS AMONG HEMOPHILIACS
A. The Hepatitis and HJV Epidemics and the Blood Industry
Individuals with hemophilia rely upon blood coagulation products,
called "factor concentrate," to alleviate the effect of their inherited
deficiency in a protein that is necessary for normal blood clotting. Factor
concentrate is manufactured from blood plasma collected from thousands of
different donors.' Consequently, hemophiliacs are exposed, in the normal
course of treatment, to a high risk of infection by blood-borne viruses.
84. See Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing, supra note 61, at 239 (describing the courts' struggle
to frame the defect question in terms of global product risks and benefits as "balancing bedlam").
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. e.
86. Many drugs commonly are understood to be unalterable in design, but this is not
necessarily the case. The possibility of alternative designs is acknowledged by the FDA. The
section of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act dealing with orphan drugs, for example, implicitly
recognizes the possibility that two different manufacturers could produce two different versions of
the same drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 316.3 (1999) (defining "same
drug"). Orphan drugs are vaccines and other drugs intended for the treatment of rare diseases.
87. The Reporters did recognize in two law journal articles that competing designs for
vaccines presented serious challenges to their position that drugs should be insulated from
alternative design review, but this concern was nowhere manifested in the Restatement (Third).
See Henderson, supra note 78, at 490-91; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 14. at 1539-40.
88. See IOM REPORT, supra note 25, at 1. Recombinant factor VIII is now available, but the
product had not yet been invented at the time of the hepatitis and HIV epidemics. See Menitove et
al., supra note 26, at 1654.
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A massive epidemic of hepatitis struck hemophiliacs in the 1970s,
transmitted through factor concentrate and other blood products. A new
strain of "non-A, non-B" hepatitis (later labeled "C" ) was identified in the
mid-1970s and became the dominant element in the epidemic.89 Physicians
quickly realized during this period that the pandemic of hepatitis among
hemophiliacs was linked to the increasing use of factor-concentrate therapy
in North America, Europe, and Japan. In 1972, the National Transfusion
Hepatitis Study found that fifty-one percent of hemophiliacs with
significant exposure to factor VIII concentrated blood products had liver
dysfunction, and all recipients of fractionated products had antibodies for
the hepatitis B virus.9" Another study five years later found an eighty-four
percent infection rate among hemophiliacs and noted that the pattern of
liver disease among hemophiliacs paralleled that among drug addicts.9 One
factor explaining this high rate of infection was that the clotting products on
which hemophiliacs relied were composed of plasma pooled from
thousands of donors, and plasma from a single infective donor
contaminated the entire pool."
Despite the dangers associated with factor concentrates, physicians
concluded that treatment with these blood products provided a net benefit to
hemophiliacs.93 Even when the risk of HIV transmission through blood
89. See E. Tabor & R.J. Gerety, Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis: New Findings and Prospects for
Prevention, 19 TRANSFUSION 669, 669 (1979) (stating that nearly 89% of cases of transfusion-
associated hepatitis in the United States in 1979 were "non-A, non-B" hepatitis and that the risk
of contracting that form of hepatitis from a blood transfusion in the United States was between
5.4% and 18.5%). Hepatitis A is transmissible through a variety of means and has a short
incubation period. Its symptoms are flu-like and may have a protracted course, but it only rarely
causes liver failure. Hepatitis B is a chronic viral disease that causes a variety of acute and chronic
problems in the liver and other organ systems. About 90% to 95% of otherwise healthy adults
recover completely from hepatitis B, but 5% to 10% remain chronically infected. Hepatitis C is a
chronic disease in 50% to 80% of cases. Ten percent to 20% of hepatitis C patients suffer from
cirrhosis or progressive liver failure. See Robert K. Ockner, Acute Viral Hepatitis. in CECIL
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 762 (J. Claude Bennett & Fred Plum eds., 1996); Robert K. Ockner.
Chronic Hepatitis, in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, supra, at 776.
90. See George F. Grady et al., Risk of Posttransfusion Hepatitis in the United States: A
Prospective Cooperative Study, 220 JAMA 692, 692-701 (1972).
91. See M.W. Hilgartner & P. Giardina, Liver Dysfunction in Patients With Hemophilia A. B.
and von Willebrand's Disease, 17 TRANSFUSION 495, 497 (1977). The high rate of infection may
have been attributable in part to commercial blood banks' increased use of blood donors from
prisons, indigent neighborhoods, and Third World countries, where rates of hepatitis infection
were high. See STARR, supra note 53, at 231-49.
92. See Grady, supra note 90, at 700.
93. See U.W. Hasiba et al., Chronic Liver Dysfunction in Multitransfused Hemophiliacs, 17
TRANSFUSION 490, 493 (1977) (concluding that "single donor products should be the preferred
mode of treatment for mild hemophiliacs who require only infrequent therapy"); see also E.D.
Gomperts et al., Hepatocellular Enzyme Patterns and Hepatitis B Virus Exposure in
Multitransfused Young and Very Young Hemophilia Patients, It AM. J. HEMATOLOGY 55. 59
(1981) (concluding that "because the long-term clinical consequences of this hepatocellular
dysfunction are currently unknown, and as the danger and problems associated with hemorrhagic
episodes are well-characterized, under current knowledge it would seem inadvisable to withhold
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became known in the 1980s, 9' reasonable health care providers continued to
prescribe factor concentrate to hemophiliacs because often there was no
alternative. The imminent threat to life presented by hemophilia-related
emergencies was deemed more compelling than the risk of contracting a
chronic illness from the blood products used to respond to these
emergencies.
There also was a culture of inevitability about illness among
hemophiliacs. The Institute of Medicine reported that "[h ]epatitis was
viewed as an acceptable risk by the government regulatory agencies
responsible for the safety of blood and blood products, the plasma
fractionation industry, the physicians who treated the individuals with
hemophilia, and the individuals with hemophilia."95 Consequently, "little
incentive was available" to improve the safety of factor concentrates
through the expeditious development of new technologies such as viral
inactivation.96
But in fact, viral inactivation methods were being researched. In the
1970s, every factor-concentrate manufacturer, unknown to the medical
community and each in isolation from its competitors, conducted research
into the possibility of using heat pasteurization to kill viruses in blood
products. However, this process was not implemented by the blood
manufacturers until well after the hepatitis epidemic had exacted its toll on
hemophiliacs. It was only in the early 1980s, as it became clear that AIDS
was a blood-borne disease, that the manufacturers of concentrated blood
products applied for FDA licensing of heat-treatment processes.' Approval
factor concentrates in the face of a hemorrhage or to alter present replacement therapy
regimens").
94. The National Cancer Institute reported in a survey of 16 hemophilia care centers that 50%
of hemophiliac patients were infected with HIV from 1978 to 1990. The rate of infection
increased rapidly after 1978 and peaked at a rate of 22 infections per 100 person-years at risk in
October 1982. See Barbara L. Kroner et al., HI-I Infection Incidence Among Persons with
Hemophilia in the United States and Western Europe. 1978-1990, 7 J. ACQUIRED IIMIUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 279, 281 (1994).
95. IOM REPORT, supra note 25, at 82.
96. Id. Physical heat or chemical detergents can be used to inactivate viruses and other
infectious agents in plasma products. There are, however, no effective methods of inactivating
viruses in whole blood or non-plasma products (such as red blood cells and platelets) used in
transfusions. Although some derivative blood products had been heat-treated since the late 1940s,
Factor VIII and IX concentrates were not pasteurized until 1983 and 1984. respectively. See id. at
5,81.
97. See id at 94. All four major blood products manufacturers applied for FDA approval
within a six-month period between June and December 1982. See id. at 92. The first application.
by Baxter Healthcare, came 12 months after the first report of a cluster of pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia (a common infection in HIV patients) in Los Angeles in June 1981, and five months
after the Center for Disease Control learned of the first suspected case of AIDS (then called " Gay
Related Immune Deficiency") in a heterosexual hemophiliac. See id.
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was quickly granted, and the techniques proved to be completely effective
in preventing viral transmission."
These same methods, if implemented earlier, would have prevented the
mass infection of hemophiliacs with HIV.99 Moreover, they would have
quashed the hepatitis epidemic among hemophiliacs. Although the hepatitis
virus is more resistant to heat than HIV, both hepatitis C and HIV are
effectively eradicated by heat pasteurization." The prevalence of hepatitis
among hemophiliacs had moved blood-products manufacturers to begin
research into viral inactivation methods, °' but it was only the shock of the
AIDS epidemic that caused them to move this research off the back burner
and to implement pasteurization across the board.
The Institute of Medicine Report suggested that several factors
contributed to the delay in bringing pasteurization techniques to market.
First, there was the widespread sense of inevitability and resignation
concerning hemophiliacs' vulnerability to hepatitis. 2  Hepatitis was
"viewed to be an acceptable risk for individuals with hemophilia because it
was considered a medically manageable complication of a very effective
treatment for hemophilia." 103 Second, the government, the medical
community, and the blood fractionators did not seem to realize that other
"new serious pathogens" might also be present in their untreated blood
98. A hemophiliac's risk of contracting HIV from concentrated blood products plummeted
from 22 in 100 to less than 4 in 100 by July 1984, when heat-pasteurized blood products came on
the market. No cases of HIV transmission have been reported among recipients of the virus-
inactivated concentrates now in use. See Kroner, supra note 94, at 284; see also Roberts &
Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1423 (noting that "[s]creening of donor populations and new
techniques for preparing factor VIII concentrates since 1985 have essentially eliminated the risk
of HIV transmission").
99. See IOM REPORT, supra note 25, at 82 (" [B]ecause the product treatment methods used
to inactivate hepatitis viruses also inactivate HIV, their availability prior to 1981 would have
minimized, if not prevented, the widespread HIV infection of persons with hemophilia."). Over
16,000 hemophiliacs in the United States were infected with HIV from blood products in the early
1980s. See id. at 1. According to one study, AIDS was the primary cause of 65% of the deaths in
hemophilic patients between 1986 and 1991, while bleeding was responsible for only 5%. See
Roberts & Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1423. Epidemic patterns of infection similar to those of the
United States were observed in other advanced countries where concentrated blood products,
imported principally from the American producers, were relied on for treatment of hemophiliacs.
For a discussion of the epidemiology of AIDS in several industrialized countries, see the works
collected in AIDS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES (David L. Kirp & Ronald Bayer eds..
1992).
100. See Menitove et al., supra note 26, at 1650-51. Hepatitis B may survive pasteurization.
See id. at 1650 (noting that "two patients were reported to be infected with hepatitis B after
receiving pasteurized... factor VIII concentrates").
101. The Institute of Medicine concluded that the "fact that the plasma fractionation industry
was able to produce an inactivated product for license consideration concurrent with, and shortly
after, the first reports of AIDS in individuals with hemophilia suggests that hepatitis infection
(rather than AIDS) provided the major motivation for the ultimate development of viral
inactivation methods." IOM REPORT, supra note 25, at 95.
102. See id. at 92-95.
103. Id. at 93.
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products. '04 Third, the FDA failed actively to encourage the blood
manufacturers to make their products safer."'5 Instead, the FDA passively
"looked to industry to provide the specific direction for progress in viral
inactivation." 0 6
This complacency on the part of regulators and manufacturers proved
disastrous because, as the Institute of Medicine reported, the blood-products
industry was characterized by a competitive environment that inhibited the
expeditious and concerted development of viral inactivation techniques.
Manufacturers' "interest in gaining competitive advantage and concerns
over yield and cost" obstructed the free exchange of research information
and so delayed the development of pasteurization techniques." The blood
industry in the United States was dominated by four players.'" Although
this high degree of concentration produced investments in research, it did
not lead to early development of heat-treatment processes. The costs
associated with heat-treatment methods, which required much higher levels
of collection, deterred their implementation. Such inertia is not uncommon
when a firm's existing level of profitability is adequate and its technical
expertise and finances are sufficient to respond if a competitor introduces a
new product that threatens its competitors' market share." Had a tort
remedy been available, the logjam might have been broken earlier, as
litigation might have compelled the disclosure of the manufacturers'
substantial research into heat-treatment methods. As it was, however, the
FDA passively deferred to the judgment of an industry whose economic
interests and behavior mitigated against the rapid development of an
alternative safer design for blood products. The lack of urgency about
pursuing this research and development had deadly consequences for the
hemophiliac users of those products.
B. Hepatitis, HIV, and the Blood Supply: A Challenge Ignored in
the Restatement (Third)
The hepatitis and HIV epidemics among hemophiliacs illustrate the
harm that can be caused by excluding blood products, prescription drugs,
and other medical products from the ordinary rules of products liability.
The epidemics struck in an environment insulated from liability concern-
the remedy of design-defect review was essentially foreclosed both by
104. Id.
105. See id. at 94.
106. Id
107. Id
108. See id at 92.
109. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 803, 842-50 (1988) (discussing the limitations of the
profit-maximizing race model of commercial innovation).
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statute and by the common law's tacit acceptance of the conventional
wisdom that the dangers presented by blood products and other drugs were
unavoidable. But it later was determined that they were not unavoidable;
rather, there were practical and technically feasible alternative safer designs
for blood products. If the alternative design test of section 2 had been
applicable to the blood manufacturers during this period, courts might
reasonably have concluded that the entire industry was negligent in its
failure to develop and adopt alternative safer designs in a timely manner.
The lessons of the hepatitis and HIV epidemics were not heeded by the
ALI. The Restatement (Third) instead maintained and ratified the insulation
of blood products manufacturers from the ordinary rules of products
liability, notwithstanding hemophiliacs' disastrous experience with
concentrated blood products in the 1970s and 1980s. This exclusion was
unchallenged at the ALI's annual meetings despite the Reporters'
acknowledgment that blood products met the "formal requisites" for
inclusion in the general law of products liability."' The Restatement (Third)
pointed to the states' broad legislative exclusions of blood products and
blandly noted that " [w]here legislation has not addressed the problem,
courts have concluded that strict liability is inappropriate for harm caused
by such product contamination." I"
Because of the blood shield laws, hemophiliacs have had no tort
remedy. The Restatement (Third)'s section 19(c) acquiesced in that result.
The outcome would have been the same even if section 6(c)'s "net benefit"
rule had been the law for blood products. The blood-products
manufacturers would have won summary judgment in any design-defect
case brought by an HIV- or hepatitis-infected hemophiliac, even though
their contaminated products unnecessarily transmitted the deadly viruses.
Under section 6(c), the manufacturers could have argued successfully that
reasonable medical practitioners prescribed concentrated blood products
because they provided a net benefit for hemophiliacs. They markedly
extended the lives of these patients, albeit at the risk of chronic infection
with hepatitis and HIV. Thus, the fractionated blood products satisfied
section 6(c). In contrast, if the alternative-safer-design test of section 2 had
been the rule, the blood manufacturers might well have been found liable
for defective product design.
The history of litigation brought against factor-concentrate
manufacturers illustrates the immense barriers that hemophiliacs have faced
in obtaining compensation for hepatitis and HIV infections contracted from
blood products. 12 Because of the blood shield laws and adverse common-
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 19 cmt. c.
111. Id.
112. Hemophiliac victims of HIV may be able to obtain a limited amount of compensation
from the federal government. The 1998 Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Act provides for
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law precedent, the prospects of success for plaintiffs in claims based on
state tort law were poor." 3 A federal class action, Wadleigh v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 4 was brought in 1993. The plaintiffs alleged that the
fractionators, who knew in the 1970s that viruses such as hepatitis were
blood-borne, should have taken precautions to prevent viral contamination
of their products."5 The fractionators used plasma collected from paid
donors, a group they should have known contained many persons at high
risk for viral infection, such as intravenous drug users. The plaintiffs
claimed the fractionators were negligent in failing to use available
technology to sterilize anti-hemophilic factor products when they knew that
hemophiliacs were being infected with serious viral diseases from their
products."16 The manufacturers defended on the basis that the HIV virus
was "unknown and unforeseeable during any period of the time defendants
were not taking the precautions plaintiffs claim they should have been
"compassionate payments" to HIV-infected hemophiliacs (and their survivors) who received
concentrated blood products from proprietary manufacturers in the period from July 1, 1982
(when the first three cases of immune suppressive disorder were identified in hemophiliacs) to
December 31, 1987 (by which time all unpasteurized blood product stocks had been exhausted or
destroyed). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300c-22 (West Supp. 1999). However. Congress still has not
funded the program. See Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Act of 1998. Procedures for Filing
Petitions for Payment, 69 Fed. Reg. 14,251 (1999). Prior to the Act's passage, American
hemophiliacs were alone among hemophiliacs in the advanced countries in having been offered no
government compensation. For a discussion of governmental compensation schemes in several
industrialized nations, see generally the works collected in AIDS IN THiE INDUSTRIALIZED
DEMOCRACIES, supra note 99.
113. See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Lab., 927 F.2d 187, 192-94 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
clotting agent's benefits to patients suffering from uncontrolled bleeding precluded plaintiff's
strict-liability action as well as plaintiff's negligence claim for failure to screen blood donors);
McKee v. Cutter Lab., 866 F.2d 219, 221-22 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that plaintiff's strict-liability
claims against a factor-concentrate manufacturer were barred by Kentucky's blood shield statute);
Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 193-95 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the HIV-infected
hemophiliac plaintiff's claim was barred by Connecticut's blood shield law); Hyland Therapeutics
v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 516 (Ct. App. 1985) (" [Liegislatures have determined
that the production and use of human blood and its derivatives for therapeutic purposes should be
encouraged; and for this purpose those who provide these products, and who are themselves free
from fault, should not be required to bear the economic loss which might otherwise be imposed
under the rules of strict liability which are applicable to sellers of commercial products
generally."); Rogers v. Miles Lab., 802 P.2d 1346, 1350-52 (Wash. 1991) (holding that common-
law strict liability was not available for claims against blood-products manufacturers because the
doctrine's effect "would be that a product, essential to sustain the life of some individuals, would
not be available").
114. 157 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The other major manufacturers of fractionated blood
products, Armour Pharmaceutical Co., Miles, Inc., Baxter Healthcare Corp.. and Alpha
Therapeutic Corp., were codefendants in the case, as was the National Hemophilia Foundation.
See id. The plaintiffs alleged that the National Hemophilia Foundation. influenced by financial
contributions from the fractionators, had given unfounded assurances of the safety of the
fractionators' products, knowing that hemophiliacs and their physicians would rely on those
assurances. See id. at 414. Wadleigh was consolidated in the Northern District of Illinois in
multidistrict litigation managed by Judge John Grady. See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate
Blood Prods. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 632 (N.D. 1I. 1996).
115. See Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 414.
116. See id.
2000] 1113
The Yale Law Journal
taking" and that they began heat pasteurization as soon as they were
technologically and legally able to do so." 7
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit decertified the plaintiff class."' Chief
Judge Posner disparaged the plaintiffs' theory "that before anyone had
heard of AIDS or HIV, it was known that Hepatitis B, a lethal disease
though less so than HIV-AIDS, could be transmitted either through blood
transfusions or through injection of blood solids" " and their argument that
"due care with respect to the risk of infection with Hepatitis B required the
defendants to take measures to purge that virus from their blood solids,
whether by treating the blood they bought or by screening the donors." 120
The court fretted that a single adverse jury verdict might bankrupt the
defendants, and that the defendants might feel compelled to agree to a large
settlement despite the lack of any proper basis for liability.' The case was
remanded for "a decentralized process of multiple trials." 122 In April 1996,
the defendants made a joint offer to settle the claim of each infected
hemophiliac who had used their products, as well as the claims of persons
who had become infected by reason of specified relationships with those
persons. The final settlement was small--each plaintiff received a net cash
payment of $100,000.123
The Rhone-Poulenc Rorer case exemplifies the hobbling effect of the
blood shield laws and immunizing rules such as sections 6(c) and 19(c) on
litigation by persons injured by defective blood products. Section 6(c), of
course, has the same effect on design-defect claims against makers of
medical devices, prescription drugs, and vaccines. Under these rules, even
if potential plaintiffs prove the existence of a reasonable alternative safer
design, the manufacturers can evade liability if they can demonstrate a net
benefit of the product to at least one class of users. Section 6(c) would not
permit, for example, a challenge to a live-virus vaccine that unnecessarily
caused the disease it was designed to prevent, even if there had long been
an equally effective killed-virus vaccine that does not cause infection.
These products are quite amenable to judicial review under the section 2
defect standard.
The choice between the Sabin live-attenuated-virus oral polio vaccine
(OPV) and the Salk killed-virus injected polio vaccine (IPV) presents a
117. In re Factor VIII, 169 F.R.D. at 633-34.
118. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
119. Id. at 1296.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1298.
122. ld at 1299.
123. See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 632, 634 (N.D.
Il1. 1996). The settlement approximated market share: Bayer paid 45%, Alpha 15%, and Armour
and Baxter 20% each. See Blood Product Firms To Pay Government $12 Million To Settle Health
Care Claims, 6 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 712, 712 (May 5, 1997).
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concrete case in which the reasonableness of a design choice can be tested
using the alternative-safer-design test. OPV virtually eradicated the polio
epidemic in the United States within a few years of its introduction. 24
However, because it contains live polio viruses, OPV sometimes caused
vaccinees to develop Vaccine Associated Paralytic Polio (VAPP). Persons
who are immunocompromised are particularly susceptible to developing
VAPP. The virus can infect not only vaccinees, but also persons in close
contact with them. Of the 133 reported cases of polio in the United States in
the 1980-1994 period, 125 were VAPP cases. t25 At present, the risk of
contracting VAPP from an OPV vaccination is about one case in 2.4
million doses distributed."2 This risk translates into eight or nine OPV
cases per year. 7
Enhanced-potency IPV, an alternative design of the polio vaccine that
does not use live polio virus, was developed in 1978. Enhanced IPV is as
effective as OPV in preventing polio but cannot itself cause the disease. 2
France, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands have eliminated polio by
relying exclusively on IPV.' 29 The United States has been slow to change,
but in 1999 the Centers for Disease Control recommended complete
reliance on IPV. t3
The question for products-liability law is whether the risk associated
with OPV can be justified in light of the availability of an alternative safer
design, the enhanced-potency [PV. In making this determination, both the
reduction of VAPP risk achievable through IPV and the relative
effectiveness of the two vaccine designs in preventing polio should be
considered. Since research has demonstrated conclusively that IPV and
OPV are equally effective in preventing the disease, the clear choice under
this test is IPV. There is thus a strong argument that the availability of IPV
has rendered OPV unreasonably unsafe, despite the enormous social utility
of OPV.
In urging that the United States move toward an IPV-only vaccination
regime, the Centers for Disease Control sought an optimal product design.
124. In the early 1950s, approximately 50,000 cases of polio per year were identified in the
United States. By 1969, only about a dozen cases were recorded. See Joseph L Melnick. Live
Attenuated Polio Virus Vaccines, in VACCINES 155, 187 thl.7-17 (Stanley A. Plotkin & Edward A.
Mortimer eds., 2d ed. 1994).
125. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Poliomyelitis Prevention in the United
States, MORBIDITY & MoRTALrrY WKLY. REP., Jan. 24, 1997. at 5 (recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices); Frederick C. Robbins. Polio--Historical, in
VACCINES, supra note 124, at 137, 141-42.
126. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 125, at 6.
127. See id at 2.
128. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 125. at 7-8; Jonas Salk et al.,
NoninfectiousPoliovirus Vaccine, in VACCINEs, supra note 124, at 216-17, 219, 222.
129. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 125, at 1-2, 8.
130. See Marlene Cimons, End Oral Polio Vaccine, Panel Says. LA. TIMES, June 18, 1999,
at A26.
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The risk-benefit analysis it undertook closely tracked the analysis of tort
law, weighing the benefits, costs, and risks of the proposed heightened
safety precaution.' However, the regulators and vaccine manufacturers
might justly be faulted by a person infected with VAPP for waiting to
recommend the exclusive use of IPV until sixteen years after France made
that change.
Under a section 2 alternative-safer-design analysis, OPV would be
deemed a defective product and the manufacturers of OPV thus could be
held liable for VAPP injuries caused by their product. But under a
section 6(c) analysis, these manufacturers would not be held liable.
Although IPV is an entirely reasonable and much safer alternative design,
the section 6(c) defect test would deem the use of OPV reasonable because
the OPV vaccine has a net benefit for its users. 32 Because it is effective in
preventing polio in the population and causes the disease in only a small
percentage of cases, in the aggregate the vaccine does more good than
harm. However, the existence of an equally effective safer alternative
design makes the risk of serious injury, however small, an unreasonable
risk. That OPV has a high social utility should be irrelevant to the question
of whether it was unreasonable not to move more quickly to the safer
alternative design. Application of the section 2 defect standard would
achieve the more just result in adjudicating VAPP claims.
Those who would rely on the market, the FDA, and "learned
intermediaries" such as physicians to assure the safety of medical products
should consider seriously the lessons of our experience with the blood
supply. The catastrophic experience of hemophiliacs with hepatitis and
HIV, as well as other problems such as polio vaccine-related disease,
should prompt us to ask several questions: Should drugs, blood products,
vaccines, and medical devices be treated differently by the law than trains,
planes, and automobiles? Should the blood shield laws be repealed as
outmoded and unduly protective of manufacturers who sell products
reasonably capable of being made safer?
131. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, General Recommendations on
Immunization, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Jan. 28, 1994, at 1-38.
132. OPV satisfies the net benefit test, notwithstanding the fact that IPV is equally effective
and safer because it cannot cause VAPP. The American Academy of Pediatrics, which still
advocates OPV as the vaccine of choice, has since 1991 maintained that both IPV and OPV are
"effective in preventing poliomyelitis," and that IPV should be offered to "individuals who have
refused OPV or in whom OPV is contraindicated" -for example, persons with compromised
immunity and children who have close contact with adults who have not been immunized against
polio. Salk, supra note 128, at 222. The World Health Organization "prefers the use of OPV
because of its low cost, ease of administration in mass campaigns, superiority in conferring
intestinal immunity, and ability to infect household and community contacts" with the vaccine
virus. Id. at 221. It should be noted that OPV's superiority in conferring intestinal immunity is
disputed. See id. at 220. Additionally, while infection of household and community contacts with
the vaccine virus can serve an immunizing function, it can also cause vaccine-associated paralytic
disease in those persons. Id. at 220-21.
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The fundamental functions of the tort system are to identify socially
unreasonable conduct and to compensate the victims of such conduct:
The issue in every products case is whether the product qua product
meets society's standards of acceptability[;] ... [w]hether ... we as
a society will live with it in its existing state or will require an
altered, less dangerous form. Stated succinctly, the question is
whether the product is a reasonable one given the reality of its use
in contemporary society.
t33
By that measure, the categorical exclusion of blood and blood products
from the generally applicable rules of products-liability law has failed. It
has exempted vital products from having to answer the basic question of
reasonableness. The Restatement (Third) as a whole reflects the law's
movement toward measuring reasonableness of product designs in terms of
the availability of an alternative safer design." If the blood-products
manufacturers had been included in this movement, rather than placed
behind a legislative shield, the alternative safer designs for blood products
that were implemented when AIDS appeared (but largely developed in the
languid days of the hepatitis epidemic) might have seen the light of day
years earlier. Those products-practical and feasible from a technological
standpoint, but unavailable due to business decisions-might have saved
8000 lives in the United States, and more abroad. Even if the manufacturers
had not been persuaded by the liability regime to adopt the safer product
design earlier, at least the victims of their defective products would have
had better prospects of obtaining compensation through the tort system.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) was the foundation for the
development of products-liability law in the last thirty years. It freed the
courts from unreasonably burdensome proof requirements and constricting
doctrines such as privity. Section 402A greatly boosted the incipient
movement toward strict liability for defective products, a development of
which the ALI may be justly proud, notwithstanding the doctrinal confusion
in the courts between negligence and strict liability. Now, unfortunately, at
a time when demographics and dollars guarantee that health care issues will
be at the forefront, the ALl has adopted a new medical products design-
defect rule that spurns these gains. The Restatement (Tlzird)'s section 6(c)
points in the wrong direction, asking less, rather than more, of those who
design, manufacture, and sell the products of our increasingly powerful
medical technologies.
133. William A. Donaher et al., The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52
TEX. L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1974). Professor Twerski was a coauthor of this article.
134. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmL d Reporter's note.
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IV. RESTORING COHERENCE TO THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN MEDICAL AND OTHER PRODUCTS
A. Restating the Restatement: Reconciling the Lines
The epidemics discussed above demonstrate the aptness of tort-system
review of drug product safety. The questions raised by the epidemics-for
example, when could safer techniques reasonably have been demanded of
blood products manufacturers?-boil down to the fundamental moral
questions in all tort litigation: Who blundered? Was the loss wrongful?
Despite critics' assertions to the contrary, 135 these issues are amenable to
adjudication by juries and judges. They demand less technical expertise
than they do reasoned judgment and reference to norms of right and justice.
It is the thesis of this Essay that prescription drugs, blood products,
vaccines, and medical devices should be subject to the same standards of
design-defect review as other products, and that the approach taken to
determine liability by section 2 of the Restatement (Third) is adequate to the
task. Underlying the preference for the section 2 standard is the view that
the section 6(c) standard sends the wrong message. It abandons the safety-
advancing objectives of products-liability law and lets the burden of loss
fall on persons whose suffering could have been reduced or avoided by
practical, feasible, and reasonably available alternative safer product
designs.
The essential ground on which the existing body of the law of medical
products liability should be restated is this: If the evidence shows that the
challenged product could have been designed more safely without
substantially impairing its effectiveness for indicated uses, or that there
existed another drug or device of equivalent effectiveness for all indicated
uses but with significantly greater safety, the product should be analyzed as
are other products under section 2(b). The fundamental comparisons to be
made involve the nature and extent of the reduction of harm from the
adoption of the alternative design, the impact on product effectiveness, and
the cost, practicality, and feasibility of making the design change.
When at the time of sale there existed no reasonable, practical, and
available safer-design choice and no other substitute product, then a
"manifestly unreasonable design" standard136 should be applied. In that
situation, the challenged product's aggregate utility for its indicated uses
should be weighed against the product's known risks at the time of sale to
135. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 78, at 495 (" [Plrescription drugs present quite different
product design issues, unique unto themselves and clearly beyond the institutional competence of
courts to manage.").
136. The "manifestly unreasonably design" test currently is embodied in a comment to
section 2 of the Restatement (Third). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. c.
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determine whether a reasonable manufacturer would have sold the product
at all. If the drug product or medical device is shown to be of such little
utility compared to its hazards that a reasonable person would not have
marketed the product at all, it will be found defective under the "manifestly
unreasonable design" standard of section 2. Products that have no
alternative safer design or substitute product remain subject to review under
section 2(c) for the adequacy of their warnings and instructions.
B. The Place of Fault in the Law of Drug and Medical Device
Design Liability
This proposed revision reconciles the two lines of cases from the era of
comment k, the Brown line and the Feldmnan-Kearl-Toner line. These two
common-law strands shared a negligence-based core. Negligence is the
main thrust of design-defect analysis in the Restatement (Third):
Section 2(b) establishes that in order for a product to be found defective, the
harm must have been reasonably preventable. 37 Under the alternative-safer-
design test, a manufacturer's failure to take reasonable precautions against
injury is negligent regardless of the overall utility of the product." As we
have seen, this functional approach is capable of accommodating defect
claims involving all types of products, including single and combination
drugs, vaccines, blood products, and medical devices. The exclusion of
medical products from section 6(c) is unnecessary and undermines the
Restatement's integrity.
Leading critics of the strict-liability movement had long argued that a
negligence-based standard was appropriate for drugs, 39 but the Reporters
rejected that approach. They declared before the ALl process even began
that "courts should not review the adequacy of prescription drug
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1. § 2 cmt. f.
138. See Green, supra note 67, at 619. Green asks:
What of the utility of the product? Irrelevant to the analysis. What we are interested in
is the marginal utility of the existing design, not the overall societal benefits of the
product. To put the point another way, imagine that we have identified a one hundred
percent effective vaccine for AIDS. Suppose the vaccine causes a mild auto-immune
reaction-a rash that lasts for a week-in one out of a million persons who take the
vaccine. The side effect can be eliminated by changing one of the inert ingredients with
which the vaccine is coated to another inert ingredient, no more expensive and equally
adept at serving its purpose. The vaccine is defectively designed despite its enormous
social utility. Risk-benefit analysis operates at the margin--the utility of the existing
design compared to the alternative-not at the level of the entire product.
IdM; see also John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and 77Teir Actionability, 33 VAND. L
REV. 551, 572 (1980) (commenting that the Barker court's language should "make clear to the
jury that it is to look primarily to the utility or benefit of that aspect of the design which is claimed
to be improper or 'defective' rather than to the utility or benefit of the product in general").
139. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning
and Policy Behind Comment k, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1139, 1141 (1985).
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designs." "140 The Restatement (Third)'s exclusion of medical products from
its section 2 rule was driven by the view, expressed by Professor
Henderson, that a "wide-open negligence approach" to drug-design review
was unwarranted absent evidence of massive failure of the FDA regulatory
process or of the system of physician control of drugs via prescription. 4'
But the experience of the hemophiliacs, as well as instances of physicians
overprescribing certain drugs despite uncertainty about their safety and
efficacy,42  shows that both types of failure have occurred. The
responsibility for such epidemics may be shared by regulators, physicians,
manufacturers, and even some patients.'43 However, that does not provide a
rationale for near-immunity for manufacturers, particularly in a system in
which comparative negligence principles provide a ready means of
allocating fault.
The fault-based approach to drug products liability has deep roots in the
Restatement (Second). By using the term "unavoidably unsafe," comment k
showed that the section 402A strict-liability doctrine had a negligence core,
because the imposition of liability required that somewhere in the design or
manufacturing process, someone have had a "fair chance" to avoid the
harm.'" The Restatement (Third) departs from that fault-based approach by
providing that, in the case of prescription medical products, reasonably
140. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 14, at 1536.
141. See Henderson, supra note 78, at 483,494.
142. Calcium antagonists used to treat hypertension, such as nifedipine, are one example. See
Curt D. Furberg et al., Nifedipine: Dose-Related Increase in Mortality in Patients with Coronary
Heart Disease, 92 CIRCULATION 1326, 1326 (1995) (finding that the use of nifedipine in
moderate to high doses increases the mortality rate of patients with coronary disease and
postulating that "[o]ther calcium antagonists may have similar adverse effects"); Teri A. Manolio
et al., Trends in Pharmacologic Management of Hypertension in the United States, 155 ARCHiVES
INTERNAL MED. 829, 829 (1995) (noting that the " [u]se of calcium antagonists and angiotensin-
converting enzyme inhibitors in hypertension has increased dramatically in the past 10 years"
despite a lack of evidence of the effectiveness of these drugs). Such data prompted federal health
officials to issue alerts in an attempt to change the pattern of prescriptions by physicians. See
Lawrence K. Altman, Risk of Death Found in Use of Heart Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. I. 1995. at
A16. The overprescribing of nifedipine is of concern not only because of its health implications,
but also because of the high cost of the drug. See Manolio et al., supra, at 829 (calculating that the
increase in the number of nifedipine prescriptions over the 1982-1992 period resulted in an
additional $3.1 billion in expenditures nationwide).
143. Patients, however, generally have limited choice in the physician-dominated health care
environment.
144. This idea was famously expressed in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881):
The true explanation of the reference of liability to a moral standard, in the sense which
has been explained, is not that it is for the purpose of improving men's hearts, but that
it is to give a man a fair chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held responsible
for it. It is intended to reconcile the policy of letting accidents lie where they fall, and
the reasonable freedom of others with the protection of the individual from injury.
Id. at 115. This concept of preventable harm is also present in the Restatement (Third)'s
section 2(b) alternative design rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note I, § 2 cmt. f
(referring to "the commonsense notion that liability for harm caused by product designs should
attach only when harm is reasonably preventable").
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avoidable harm will not be the basis for liability except where the product's
risks as a whole outweigh its dangers.
In support of this rule, the Reporters drew most heavily on the 1988
Brown v. Superior Court decision. But the court in that case actually
acknowledged the possibility of redesign of the carcinogenic anti-
miscarriage drug DES.'45 The Brown court nonetheless rejected the usual
form of risk-utility analysis, as set forth in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.'6
The Brown court explained:
[T]here is an important distinction between prescription drugs and
other products such as construction machinery, a lawnmower, or
perfume, the producers of which were held strictly liable. In the
latter cases, the product is used to make work easier or to provide
pleasure, while in the former it may be necessary to alleviate pain
and suffering or to sustain life. Moreover, unlike other important
medical products (wheelchairs, for example), harm to some users
from prescription drugs is unavoidable. Because of these
distinctions, the broader public interest in the availability of drugs
at an affordable price must be considered in deciding the
appropriate standard of liability for injuries resulting from their
use.1
47
The Brown court expressed a fear that useful products would be driven
from the market, either by juries sympathetically identifying with the
injured plaintiff1 s or by courts engaging in crude risk-benefit calculations
that had already been performed by a presumably more competent
regulator, the Food and Drug Administration. 4 9
145. Justice Mosk wrote:
We agree with defendants that Barker contemplates a safer alternative design is
possible, but we seriously doubt their claim that a drug like DES cannot be
"redesigned" to make it safer. For example, plaintiff might be able to demonstrate at
trial that a particular component of DES rendered it unsafe as a miscarriage
preventative and that removal of that component would not have affected the efficacy
of the drug. Even if the resulting product, without the damaging component. would bear
a name other than DES, it would do no violence to semantics to view it as a " redesign"
of DES.
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988).
146. 573 P.2d443 (Cal. 1978).
147. Brown, 751 P.2d at 478-79 (citation omitted).
148. How much power remains in that argument is debatable. See, e.g., DeHanes v. Rothman,
727 A.2d 8, 12-13 (NJ. 1999) (citing survey evidence indicating that jurors believe liability suits
increase their own costs as consumers and deeply mistrust civil litigants and paid expert
witnesses).
149. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic
Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SErON HALL L REV. 1437 (1994).
Viscusi and his coauthors argue that
laissezfaire pharmaceutical litigation often creates perverse incentives. These incentive
effects can lessen the value or even countermand the judgments of the FDA. thereby
overturning the agency's well-considered risk-benefit assessments. Because a fully
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Pharmaceutical manufacturers welcomed the Brown decision. They
understandably had viewed with alarm the emerging trend toward strict
products-liability law, and they did not wish to share the label "toxic torts"
with products like asbestos. But by the time Brown was decided, the tide
had already fallen from the high-water mark of strict-liability jurisprudence.
That zenith was represented by the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,'50 an asbestos case, that
liability would be imposed even for unknowable hazards.
The Beshada court adopted a dual standard of product defect. It first
inquired into whether the product's utility outweighed its risk. If not, the
court deemed the product "not reasonably fit for its intended purposes" and
imposed strict liability for the injuries it caused. ' 5' If so, the court proceeded
to ask whether that risk had been reduced "to the greatest extent possible
consistent with the product's utility." ' This second prong examines
whether "the same product could have been made or marketed more
safely" through an alternative design.
53
The asbestos producers in Beshada defended on the ground that "the
danger of which they failed to warn was undiscovered at the time the
product was marketed and... undiscoverable given the state of scientific
knowledge" at the time of sale." The court accepted these assertions as
true, for the sake of argument, but rejected the defense of unknowability:
The imputation of knowledge is, of course, a legal fiction. It is
another way of saying that for purposes of strict liability the
defendant's knowledge of the danger is irrelevant. The imputation
of knowledge does not represent any presumption that defendants
informed FDA almost certainly makes erroneous risk-benefit judgments less often than
our tort system, the role of tort law in this context needs to be refocused.
Id. at 1475.
150. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2. at 1271
("Decisions published during the late 1970s and early 1980s represent what many observers
consider to be the high water marks of this expansionary, remarkably proplaintiff period."). The
Beshada decision was widely criticized by academic commentators. The Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories opinion, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984), cites a number of these criticisms, including
Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 877-82 (1983); Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty To Warn:
Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 892, 901-05
(1983); John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 754-56 (1983); Robert D. Casale, Comment, Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Adding Uncertainty to Injury, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 982, 1008-15
(1983); William R. Murray, Jr., Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty To Warn of
Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71 GEO. L.J. 1635 (1983); and Robert D. Towry,
Note, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 625 (1983).
151. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 545.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 542.
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knew or even that they could have known of the product's
dangers.
1 5
The pharmaceutical industry was alarmed by Beshada's assertion that
the state of knowledge at the time of manufacture was irrelevant. However,
Beshada was quickly followed by the New Jersey Supreme Court's
declaration, in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, that the Beshada standard
of liability was to be limited to asbestos cases.' The Feldman court also
rejected the invitation by the defendant, Lederle, and a host of
pharmaceutical industry organizations to rule that prescription medicines
should be categorically exempted from the ordinary rules of design-defect
review and strict liability for defective products.'5 It decided to treat drugs
like other products-that is, to subject drugs to the risk-utility weighing
prescribed by Wade. 58 Wade's formulation had been incorporated verbatim
into New Jersey's Model Civil Jury Charges.'59
The Feldman decision embraced Wade's "time of distribution" test of
constructive knowledge of danger"6 and laid the foundation for a fault-
based regime governing defects in drug design. Feldman restated the New
Jersey Supreme Court's long-held view that the test of defectiveness is two-
pronged: One asks, first, whether the product as a whole does more good
than harm (the per se negligent marketing test) and, second, if so, whether
the manufacturer has reduced the risks of the product to the greatest extent
possible. The court thus approached drug-design review with the same
fault-based concepts that had constituted the dominant doctrines of design-
defect liability since the wholesale adoption of the Wade risk-utility
balancing test in 1978.126
Victor Schwartz, the influential author, practitioner, and lobbyist,
praised Feldman's rule that liability would not be imposed for defective
drug designs when a risk of harm was unknown at the time of
155. lad at 544 n.3 (citation omitted).
156. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (NJ. 1984).
157. See id at 380 ("We do not agree that the protective shield of comment k immunizes all
prescription drugs. Moreover, we are of the opinion that generally the principle of strict liability is
applicable to manufacturers of prescription drugs.").
158. See Wade, supra note 2, at 837-38.
159. See George W. Conk, Compared to lut? Instructing the Jury on Product Defect Under
the Products Liability Act and the Third Restatement of Torts: Products Uability. 30 SETON HALL
L. REV. 273, 275 (1999).
160. See John E. Keefe & Richard C. Henke, Presumed Knowledge of Danger: Legal Fiction
Gone Awry?, 19 SETON HALL L. REv. 174, 185-86 (1989). Unlike Keeton. who argued that it was
the state of knowledge of danger at the time of trial that determined liability, Wade had long
argued that liability was limited to dangers that were scientifically knowable that the time of
marketing. See id at 180 & n.39.
161. See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (NJ. 1978).
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manufacture. 62 Schwartz argued against strict liability and in favor of a
safety-advancing negligence standard in cases involving pharmaceutical
products: 1
63
The basic message here is that, in general, ethical drugs and harms
that arise out of their use should not subject their manufacturer,
distributor or retailer to strict liability. Society wishes to encourage
the manufacture of ethical drugs, and the research and development
of new drugs....
... If [however] an ethical drug, in light of the state of human
knowledge at the time of manufacture, can be made safe for its
intended and ordinary use, the manufacturer is to meet that
standard. 6'
Schwartz recognized, as Prosser had, that comment k could be read as
infusing the entire law of design defect with a fault-based essence. He noted
that the courts' distinction between drugs and other products was a function
not of any explicit mandate in comment k, but rather of the absence, in that
comment, of any examples other than pharmaceuticals. 165 He concluded that
"[flor this reason the courts and most commentators have assumed that
comment k relates to pharmaceuticals and this assumption as a practical
matter appears to be correct." 166 Thus, in Schwartz's view, the "drugs are
different" approach was an accurate description of how the courts had
construed comment k up to that point, but was not the only reasonable
interpretation of comment k. While Schwartz did not go a step further and
explicitly affirm the amenability of both medical devices and at least some
drugs (such as vaccines and processed blood products) to alternative-
design-centered risk-utility analysis, he did recognize the doctrinal
inadequacy of the common-law bifurcation of design-defect law.
Schwartz argued that in a negligence-based products-liability regime,
the standard of care owed by manufacturers need not be diluted for
pharmaceutical manufacturers. While it frequently had been argued that
public policy considerations-for example, the concern that drug
companies be encouraged to innovate and bring new medicines rapidly to
market-militated in favor of greater insulation of drug manufacturers from
liability, Schwartz observed that there might also be policy reasons to hold
such manufacturers to "the very highest of standards":
162. See Schwartz, supra note 139, at 1145. Schwartz's article was cited approvingly both by
the Idaho Supreme Court in Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297, 305 (Idaho 1987), and
by the California Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 475-76 (Cal. 1988).
163. See Schwartz, supra note 139, at 1139.
164. Id. at 1141.
165. Seeid.
166. Id. at 1141 (citing Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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The circumstances in which pharmaceutical manufacturers must
deal directly involve severe risks to human life. Thus, their standard
of care is not the "reasonableness" of a person who repairs a
television set or drives a car-it is the most serious and intense
obligation that one can find in the entire body of negligence law. 67
The California Supreme Court cited Schwartz's article in its Brown
opinion, ' 6s but unfortunately failed to understand Schwartz's point. Despite
its nod toward "general principles of negligence," Brown is a confused
opinion. The court became tangled in its efforts to reconcile the fault-free
rhetoric of its opinions in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling,'70 Greennan v.
Yuba Power Products,17' and Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., with the
fault-based risk-utility balancing in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.'" The
incoherence that the Reporters later attributed to comment k is not that of
the case law as a whole, which, as we have seen, generally follows the
furrows of the rest of the field. The unintelligibility of which the Reporters
complained is rooted in the Brown decision, upon which they relied.
The Brown court rejected strict liability while claiming to preserve the
possibility of a negligence-based review for defects in drug design.'"4 Yet
the court held its negligence-based Barker risk-utility analysis inappropriate
for drug-defect claims, mischaracterizing it as a strict-liability standard.
Like many modem products-liability cases, the Barker decision contains
strict-liability language but is actually a negligence-based liability analysis.
The Barker risk-utility factors clearly were derived from the classic
formulation of negligence by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co.'T7 The simultaneous embrace of "general negligence
principles" and rejection of Barker's risk-utility analysis brought doctrinal
167. Id at 1145.
168. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470. 475-76 (Cal. 1988).
169. Id at483 n.12.
170. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor. J., concurring) (advocating the adoption of strict
liability for product defects).
171. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (applying strict liability where the plaintiff injured himself
with a power tool).
172. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972) (applying strict liability where the plaintiff was injured when
an aluminum safety hasp broke).
173. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); see also Brown. 751 P.2d at 477 (explaining Barker).
174. Brown, 751 P.2d at 482-83 ("[We hold that a manufacturer is not strictly liable for
injuries caused by a prescription drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and accompanied
by warnings of its dangerous propensities that were either known or reasonably scientifically
knowable at the time of distribution.").
175. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Barker, 573 P.2d at 455 (adopting a five-
factor design-defect test). Hand's formula for negligence states that if the probability of injury (P)
multiplied by the magnitude of injury (L) was greater than the burden on the manufacturer (B) of
taking additional measures to avoid the injury (in other words, if PL > B). then the manufacturer
is negligent. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. Though a negligence case. Carroll Towing also
formed the basis for Wade's enormously influential 1973 article describing his risk-utility analysis
for products-liability litigation. See Wade, supra note 2.
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incoherence to the Brown decision. The case consequently came to stand
for immunizing drug manufacturers even when they designed avoidably
unsafe products. The key omission in Brown is the court's failure to adopt
Schwartz's approach, which, using negligence terms, imposed a high duty
of care on pharmaceutical manufacturers. Brown does not hold
pharmaceutical manufacturers to the standard of care for reasonable persons
in like circumstances. The final, casual affirmation in the Brown opinion of
negligence as a standard176 is too weak to repair the damage done by the
repudiation of the Barker risk-utility analysis. Brown is the intellectual
source of the section 6(c) rule, which brings incoherence rather than
consistency to the law of products liability.
Justice Mosk's justifications in Brown for setting drugs apart-that
drugs "alleviate pain and suffering or... sustain life" and that "harm to
some users from prescription drugs is unavoidable" ' -could be said of
many kinds of products.'78 To conclude that a product deserves immunity
from liability, the factual determination must be made that its dangers are in
fact "unavoidable." Harm preventable by reasonable care or by reliance on
practical, feasible, and available alternative designs is not "unavoidable,"
and manufacturers should be held responsible for failing to prevent such
harms. Product designs that omit such choices do not deserve the same
protection from liability as products that alleviate pain and suffering and for
which there truly is no other, safer-design choice. The solution is to treat
"all products alike rather than trying to distinguish before the fact the good
or acceptably dangerous products (that get special treatment) from all other
products (that get no special treatment)." 179
It also has been argued that the Brown court's finding that prescription
drugs do greater good than other kinds of products, while it has a strong
rhetorical ring, does not withstand scrutiny:
[I]t is a relatively short step from health-care products to other
products that improve our quality of living and, by so doing,
alleviate or prevent physical pain and suffering or save
lives.... Prosser was right. There is no elegant way to distinguish
between prescription drugs, all drugs, and other products such as
"hair dye and shaving lotion." ... Following the logic of the
above, the next step should be to apply the risk-benefit analysis of
Brown [which suggests that negligence should govern] to all
products liability cases. We would then have come full circle.
Products liability would have been created initially as something
176. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 483 n.12.
177. Id. at 478.
178. See J. Clark Kelso, Brown v. Abbott Laboratories and Strict Products Liability, 20 PAC.
L.J. 1, 26-28 (1988).
179. Id. at 26.
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distinct from negligence and warranty but would have ended up
being recognized as the same as negligence and warranty."
There are many reasons, therefore, to doubt the wisdom of the
Reporters' decision to carve out special liability rules for medical products.
In the final analysis, it is unexplained why such useful products as
microchips, personal computers, telephones, trains, planes, and automobiles
should always come in second to medical products in the calculus of social
good. Moreover, why should things that we hope will bring us pleasure be
subject to a more stringent standard of products liability than products that
we hope will restore or maintain our health? Why should we ask less of
those who make prescription drugs than we do of makers of other useful
goods?
C. The Rationales for Section 6(c)
The rationales set forth in the Restatement (Third) for the special
liability rules for drugs, vaccines, medical devices, and blood products do
not sufficiently justify the ALI's failure to place these products within the
alternative-safer-design analysis applicable to all other products. The
Restatement gives the following reasons for the section 6(c) rule:




(2) Plaintiffs have a strict-liability action for defects in
manufacturing."
(3) Patients have the protection of a learned intermediary-the
prescribing physician-and so receive the information
necessary to make an informed choice regarding the risks and
benefits of prescription drugs.'83
(4) Subjecting decisions about drug design to the section 2(b)
defect analysis applicable to other products would hamper
manufacturers' efforts to innovate and develop new
medicines."
(5) The FDA regulates drugs and vaccines for safety,
effectiveness, and adequate labeling, rendering a stringent
liability rule unnecessary."
180. d at 26,28.
181. See RESTArEMEN (THIRD), supra note I, § 6 cmL d.
182. See id cmt. c.
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(6) Increased exposure to liability would drive up the price of
prescription drugs and make them less available to
consumers.1
86
None of these rationales justifies the rule of section 6(c). The
availability of warning and manufacturing defect remedies is irrelevant to
whether there should be a design-defect remedy. Although plaintiffs
frequently plead all three theories, there are many cases in which the
plaintiff can present a colorable design-defect claim, but has no evidence of
a manufacturing defect or warning defect. For no other kind of product is it
suggested that the availability of a warning claim makes the design-defect
claim superfluous. No reasoning is offered for this radical departure from
the general rule that products-liability law recognizes three distinct claims
for warning defect, manufacturing defect, and design defect.
The advice of a learned intermediary undoubtedly is helpful in ensuring
that patients are informed of the risks and benefits of taking prescription
drugs. Moreover, the manner of use may be controlled through the
prescription requirements imposed by the FDA.'87 Manufacturers' warnings
and instructions to prescribing physicians properly are considered in
determining the foreseeable uses and conditions of use of the product.
However, physicians do not make design choices; they select from among
products available in the market. The designer should no more be freed
from its duty to market safe products by the existence of an intermediary
physician than a manufacturer of industrial equipment should be relieved of
the duty to include safety devices merely because employers are obligated
by law to provide a safe workplace.'88
The FDA regulation defense is superficially appealing, but ultimately
unsatisfactory. The FDA does not claim to review products for optimal
design. It explains its review process as follows: "We assemble a
team... to review the company's data and proposed use for the drug. If the
drug is effective and we are convinced its health benefits outweigh its risks,
186. See id.
187. Possible regulations include the requirement that some drugs be prescribed only by
physicians with special training and the approval of drugs only for certain uses. See Margaret
Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for Some but Not Others: The FDA Experience and Alternatives
for Products Liability, 36 HOUS. L. REv. 927, 945 (1999).
188. See Perez v. Wyeth Lab., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (1999) (imposing a duty on the
defendant drug manufacturer adequately to inform users of prescription drugs regarding risks
where there is direct-to-consumer advertising). The court noted that manufacturers may be held
responsible even where others have played intervening roles; for example, a manufacturer may be
liable for failing to include safety devices on machinery despite its expectation that the employer
who purchased the machinery would install the devices. See id. at 1261 (citing Bexiga v. Havir
Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281 (1972)).
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we approve it for sale."'" FDA review thus asks less of drug and medical
device manufacturers than the common law of products liability asks of
other kinds of manufacturers.
It is therefore unsurprising that courts traditionally have rejected
regulatory-compliance defenses, reasoning that meeting regulatory
standards may not constitute reasonable care under the circumstances."g
The defense is inconsistent with the general rule stated in section 4 of the
Restatement (Third) that compliance with product-safety statutes and
administrative regulations, while suggestive of reasonable care, is not
dispositive t gt Section 4 reflects the traditional common-law tort doctrine
that administrative codes set mininum requirements; reasonable care may
require more. This is a prudent approach.
As Teresa Moran Schwartz has observed, in an era of constrained
government resources, there may be more reason than ever to reject the
regulatory-compliance defense.'92 Products-liability actions can enforce
regulatory standards effectively and may be more efficient than the
cumbersome process of administrative rulemaking, which is so slow that
government standards frequently become outdated. 93 In an environment
that oscillates between fear of overregulation and demands for stricter
controls-an environment characterized by budget pressures and frequent
changes in political winds-the burden of persuasion falls on those who
would have the courts depart from the prevailing rule that regulatory
standards are relevant evidence, but not definitive statements, of what
constitutes reasonable care in product design.
Nor should FDA approval of a medical product be viewed as a
guarantee of the product's safety. Although Congress has expanded the
FDA's function from policeman to gatekeeper," it is by design a passive
189. CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERvs., 1998 REPORT TO THE NATION: IMPROVING HUMAN HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS
1(1999).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND). supra note 4. § 288C (citing decisions holding that
compliance with a legislative enactment or administrative regulation does not preclude a finding
of negligence where a reasonable person would have taken additional precautions); cf. NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1999) (providing that in failure-to-warn suits, an FDA-approved warning
carries a rebuttable presumption of adequacy).
191. RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supra note l, § 4.
192. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the
Right Balance Between the Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFoR, 431,443-47 (1997).
193. See idL at 444-45.
194. See Merrill, supra note 22, at 1819-20. A legislative change in 1962 converted what had
been a notification system (permitting marketing unless the FDA acted within 180 days) to a
gatekeeping system in which the maker was obliged to wait for the agency to affirm safety and
effectiveness. "The agency was empowered to require premarket approval for certain devices;
however, Congress limited this form of control to products that were life-sustaining or presented
significant risks to patients." Id at 1800. The FDA's review of new products remains limited by
manpower constraints, budget constraints, and design. In 1993. the FDA Committee for Clinical
Review reported "certain patterns of deficiencies in the design, conduct, and analysis of clinical
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agency, not an initiator. The FDA reviews applications for premarket
approval of new drugs and devices, but it does not conduct research or
development. The tragedy of the hemophiliacs demonstrates the limitations
inherent in this structure.
195
The tort system can encourage FDA regulatory vigor and competence.
The FDA's proposed regulations to stem tobacco use by children and
adolescents,' 96 for example, were promulgated after states pursued tort
actions to recover from the tobacco companies Medicaid money spent on
smoking-related illnesses.'97 Information discovered in litigation (such as
the tobacco companies' manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes and
their knowledge of the addictiveness of nicotine), in addition to spurring the
FDA to action, has been a powerful force in changing public attitudes about
the risks of smoking and the culpability of the tobacco companies. Pictures
of smokers' graveyards appear on roadside billboards, which until recently
were graced by nubile couples cavorting in crystal waters and seeking
cigarettes' promise of smooth satisfaction.'
The regulatory-compliance defense is undermined further by the
recognition that the decisions of courts can function in a way
complementary to the regulatory function of administrative agencies. Tort
litigation has a democratizing function. It not only can compel disclosure of
policy-relevant information, but also may help inform regulators of
evolving community standards and values. The focus of legal reform
therefore should be not on substituting agency regulation for regulation by
the tort liability system, but on determining how tort law and agency
regulation can best complement one another to manage the burdens and
benefits presented by technological change.' In this respect, it is helpful to
recall that courts have a long tradition of borrowing legislative and
studies in sufficient numbers to suggest that these deficiencies represent a common problem" in
reviewing pre-market approval applications. Id. at 1825.
195. A further problem with the regulatory-compliance defense is that rather than preventing
litigation, the FDA-compliance defense may just shift the issues in drug injury litigation. See
Green, Statutory Compliance, supra note 79, at 490-93, 508. Litigants will conduct inquiries into
whether the manufacturer complied with FDA requirements for the investigation and marketing of
the drug. See id. "The extensiveness of FDA regulations and the complexity of the pre-marketing
testing process could transform that inquiry into a Serbian bog that would consume substantial
resources." Id. at 508.
196. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (to have been
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 897) (proposed Aug. 1i, 1995). The measure has been
stayed. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 1495 (1999).
197. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 Extra LEXIS 76 (D.
Minn. Mar. 7, 1998).
198. The settlement agreement between Minnesota and Philip Morris mandates the removal
of all tobacco billboards in the state and provides for more than $100 million for smoking-
cessation programs. See Tobacco Companies To Pay Minnesota, Blue Cross $6.6 Billion Plus
Fees, MEALEY'S LmG. REP.: TOBACCO, May 21, 1998, at 5.
199. See Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137 (1995).
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regulatory standards to define standards of care for purposes of negligence
claims.' Administrative agencies also can borrow from the tort liability
system: Their regulatory standards can be shaped by juries' expressions of
social judgments about what conduct is and is not reasonable.
What of the argument that a tougher liability standard for drug
manufacturers would hamper innovation in the drug market? It is argued, in
support of section 6(c), that a more stringent liability rule would deter
research and development of new and effective drugs; that manufacturers
who did develop new drugs would test them longer, delaying their
availability to consumers; and that beneficial drugs might be withdrawn
from the market for fear of products-liability judgments"' However,
prescription products already are subject to strict liability for manufacturing
defects and negligence-based liability for failure to warn, and there is no
suggestion in the Restatement (Third) that these liability rules intolerably
hinder innovation. Moreover, even if increasing manufacturers' exposure to
design-defect liability would result in some additional delay in bringing
products to market, this would not necessarily be undesirable. The public
might well have benefited from additional delay in bringing such products
as factor concentrates for hemophiliacs, the Dalkon Shield,' and silicon
breast implants 3 to market, because the manufacturers might have
developed a safer alternative design.
The accuracy of the objection that increased exposure to liability would
hamper innovation is extremely difficult to gauge. Reliable data to explain
the motivations of manufacturers, their behavior, and the consequences are
largely unavailable.' A RAND Corporation study, finding little evidence
of a large effect of tort litigation on innovation, concluded that "liability is
unlikely to deter efforts to develop a drug that offers a major breakthrough
and the promise of huge profits," but that "l]iability concerns may deter
efforts to develop more modest drugs." '
200. See Schwartz, supra note 193, at 431; see also Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 723 A-2d 960,
966-69 (NJ. 1999) (discussing the relevance of federal safety standards in determining the duty of
care of a general contractor in preventing worksite injuries).
201. See Green, Statutory Compliance, supra note 79, at 466-67.
202. See generally Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985) (involving a
design-defect claim against the makers of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device).
203. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL 42-44 (1996) (describing safety-enhancing
innovations in breast-implant design following the introduction of the first implants by Dow
Coming).
204. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1288 (1992) ("In short, our society
has been unable to produce research that is even minimally adequate to answer our most basic
questions about the behavior of the civil justice system.").
205. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 340 (1996) (citing STEVEN
GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL
DEVICES 166, 174 (1993)).
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The Reporter's note to section 6 cites no empirical evidence to bolster
its assertion that design-defect liability for drugs would drive drug prices
unacceptably high.2' The only support offered is a parenthetical citation to
the Brown decision. The Reporters' failure to explain why the cost of
injuries from defectively designed drugs and medical devices should be
borne by the injured rather than the designer and manufacturer shows just
how far we have strayed from the consumer-oriented days of strict
products-liability law.2' 7 The increased-cost argument resonates strongly in
the current climate, but it is important to note that the fear of excessive
costs is predicated on the notion that products-liability law is unpredictable.
Because product manufacturers face great uncertainty in the tort system and
the possibility of crippling jury awards, it is argued, they will be
excessively cautious, with the result that the rate at which drugs are brought
to market will be slowed and their price increased. This argument fails once
we abandon the sometimes-confused liability regime of the section 402(A)
era and adopt the more predictable alternative-safer-design test of
section 2(b).
In summary, none of the rationales set forth in the Restatement (Third)
justifies the bifurcation of products-liability law and the near-immunity
from liability granted to makers of prescription drugs and other medical
products. To the contrary, there are many reasons why meaningful design-
defect review is desirable for such products. The deterrent and expressive
functions of the tort system may help bring the values of the community to
the minds of designers and regulators. Furthermore, courts, which act on a
case-by-case basis, are also much more likely than legislatures to be able to
measure accurately a product's benefits, risks, and alternatives. Courts also
are better suited than legislatures to determine whether the dangers of a
particular prescription drug or medical device are "unavoidable" -that is,
not susceptible of design improvements. But under section 6(c)'s rule, none
of these benefits of judicial review of medical product designs will be
reaped.
CONCLUSION
The Restatement (Third) correctly restates the law of products liability
in the alternative-safer-design test of section 2(b). In design-defect cases, it
is generally a negligence standard, not a strict-liability rule, that determines
whether a product is defective. That fault-based standard, the distilled
206. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 6 cmt. b Reporter's note.
207. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (describing the
broad trends of judicial retrenchment, declining plaintiff success, and reduced awards in products-
liability cases).
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expression of thirty years of design-defect litigation, should be applied
equally to medical products. The ALl should eliminate the special liability
rules for drugs, medical devices, vaccines, and blood products set forth in
sections 6(c) and 19(c). Drawing medical products into the fold of section 2
would resolve the doctrinal conflicts that have confused courts and
legislatures and obstructed justice for persons such as the hemophiliacs who
suffered reasonably preventable harms from medical products.
Section 6(c) casts aside the alternative-safer-design test for drugs and
medical devices and instead urges courts to ask whether the product has a
net benefit for any class of user. Among the rationales for this rule is the
idea that medical products are of special importance because of their
lifesaving qualities. But it is not the social utility of a product that is at issue
in traditional fault-based design-defect analysis; it is the designer's failure
to adopt an available, practical, and safer design. Because alternative-design
analysis will be increasingly viable for prescription drugs and medical
devices as medical science advances, it is important for the ALI to close the
gap between the Feldman-Kearl-Toner line of cases and the Brown line by
establishing a clear negligence standard applicable to all products.
The pharmaceutical industry, like every regulated industry, seeks
freedom from liability and regulatory constraints in order to pursue
unfettered innovation. Its plea for freedom often falls on sympathetic ears,
both in the legislatures and among consumers.208 But the price of freedom is
responsibility. The process of invention is policed, but not controlled, by
regulatory agencies. The general thrust of the Restatement of products-
liability law has been to place primary responsibility for product safety on
the designer, not the regulator or the reseller. Arguments for immunity or
near-immunity from design-defect liability cut against that trend. The law
should encourage product designers to ask not only how to make a product,
but also whether to make it, and why. The designer should consider the full
range of design considerations 3 9 The process of selecting a design should
be informed by the knowledge that the designer someday may have to
justify the particular balance it chose between risk and utility. Such
thoughtful consideration of the need to justify design choices ultimately
will result in better, safer products.
208. See, e.g., STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE 339 (1996) (detailing the impact that AIDS
activists have had on the FDA drug-approval process, including expanded access to experimental
therapies and accelerated approval).
209. Cf Owen, supra note 47, at 754 ('" mhe goal of both design engineers and the law
should be to promote in products an ideal balance of product usefulness, cost, and safety.").
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